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HOW THE WAR ON TERROR IS TRANSFORMING
PRIVATE U.S. LAW
MARYAM JAMSHIDI*
ABSTRACT
In thinking about the War on Terror’s impact on U.S. law, what most
likely comes to mind are its corrosive effects on public law, including
criminal law, immigration, and constitutional law. What is less appreciated
is whether and how the fight against terrorism has also impacted private
law. As this Article demonstrates, the War on Terror has had a negative
influence on private law, specifically on torts, where it has upended longstanding norms, much as it has done in the public law context.
Case law construing the private right of action under the Antiterrorism
Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (“Section 2333”), shines the brightest light
on this trend. Using Section 2333, private individuals can bring civil suits
against third-parties for injuries purportedly resulting from violence
committed by terrorist groups. In deciding these cases, which sound in
intentional torts, many courts have treated Section 2333 as a critical
component of U.S. counterterrorism efforts. This marriage of tort law and
national security has transformed Section 2333 into anything but the
traditional tort Congress intended it to be. In the process, a line of
jurisprudence has developed under the statute, which carries negative
implications for the discipline of torts writ large, reinforces the War on
Terror’s ideologically-infused narratives about terrorism itself, and
ensnares defendants with little to no meaningful connection with terrorism
or terrorist groups.
These consequences, which have largely gone unnoticed by both tort
scholars and critics of U.S. counterterrorism efforts, are important ones.
They highlight the ways America’s never-ending war has not only
undermined public, but also private, law, and underscore how torts, in
particular, have helped perpetuate the political ideology at the root of that
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battle. This Article seeks to uncover and explain these trends, for the first
time, and offer some preliminary solutions.
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INTRODUCTION
In cataloguing the War on Terror’s impact on U.S. law, what usually
comes to mind are its corrosive effects on public law, including on
constitutional liberties, principles of criminal liability, and the development
of immigration law and policy. What is typically less appreciated, however,
is how terrorism policy has also eroded private law. Much as it has done in
the public law context, the War on Terror has had a negative impact on
private law, specifically on torts, where it has upended long-standing norms.
Case law construing the private right of action under the Antiterrorism Act
of 1992 (ATA),1 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (“Section 2333” or “civil statute” or
“civil material support statute”), shines the brightest light on this dynamic.
Since September 11th, 2001, the U.S. government has increasingly used
criminal prosecutions under the ATA as a key part of its courtroom battle
against terrorism.2 Through Section 2333, private plaintiffs have joined in
this war.3 Using this law, “[a]ny national of the United States injured in his
or her person, property, or business by reason of an act of international
terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors or heirs, may sue therefor in any
appropriate district court of the United States.” 4 As reflected by its
legislative history, the civil statute, which sounds in intentional torts, is
designed to subvert terrorism by imposing “[tort] liability at any point along
the causal chain.” 5 The statute provides for substantial monetary recovery,
including treble damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation costs.6
1.
18 U.S.C. §§ 2331–2339D. The ATA was originally enacted in 1990 but was repealed and
reenacted in 1992 due to a technical error. Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102572, S1003, 106 Stat. 4506, 4521 (entitled “Terrorism Civil Remedy”).
2.
Norman Abrams, The Material Support Terrorism Offenses: Perspectives Derived from the
(Early) Model Penal Code, 1 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 5, 5–6 (2005) (noting that prosecutions
under the ATA are central to the U.S. government’s anti-terrorism efforts).
3.
Section 2333 was passed before September 11th, 2001 but remained largely dormant before
the attacks. Seth N. Stratton, Taking Terrorists to Court: A Practical Evaluation of Civil Suits Against
Terrorists Under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 9 S UFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 27, 32 (2004).
4.
18 U.S.C. § 2333(a).
5.
S. Rep. No. 102-342, at 22 (1992); see 137 CONG. REC. S4511-04 at 1 (Apr. 16, 1991) (“The
ATA accords victims of terrorism the remedies of American tort law . . . .”).
6.
18 U.S.C. § 2333(a). The decision to create Section 2333 was triggered, in part, by the 1985
murder of Leon Klinghoffer, an American citizen, by four hijackers on board the Achille Lauro cruise
liner. See Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC, 891 F. Supp. 2d 335, 353 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) [hereinafter Gill I]
(“[Section 2333’s] legislative history indicates that the civil remedy provision became law in large part
because of the Klinghoffer litigation.”). Klinghoffer’s wife and daughters had sued the owner of the ship
and various parties in U.S. court, seeking damages for Klinghoffer’s death. Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille
Lauro Ed Altri-Gesitone Motonave Achille Lauro Amministrazione Straordinaria, 739 F. Supp. 854
(S.D.N.Y. 1990), vacated, 937 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1991). Because the incident had occurred abroad,
plaintiffs initially faced various jurisdictional hurdles, which they ultimately overcame. See id. at 858–
59 (holding that subject matter jurisdiction existed under the Death on the High Seas Act, which provided
basis for claims of wrongful death in international waters), vacated on other grounds, 937 F.2d 44.
Nevertheless, the Klinghoffer case raised concerns about the absence of clear jurisdiction in U.S. courts
over claims relating to foreign terrorist attacks. Section 2333 was meant to fill this gap, by extending
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In the years since the War on Terror began, thousands of private
plaintiffs have used Section 2333 to bring cases for injuries purportedly
resulting from terrorist activities. Their targets have been entities and
individuals who allegedly violated the ATA’s criminal terrorism laws,
specifically 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (Section 2339A) and 18 U.S.C. § 2339B
(Section 2339B) (collectively “criminal material support statutes” or
“criminal statutes”).7 Sections 2339A and 2339B, which prohibit “material
support” for terrorism, are aimed at third-party contributors that have
allegedly engaged in activities, ranging from monetary support to
educational training, in aid of terrorist groups or activities. 8 A typical
Section 2333 case, for example, involves a defendant bank accused of
providing financial services to an entity which is allegedly affiliated with a
terrorist group that caused plaintiff’s injuries. As with most cases under
Section 2333, these suits are often based on underlying violations of one or
both criminal provisions, each of which may qualify as “acts of international
terrorism” under the civil statute. 9
In adjudicating these cases, courts have described Section 2333 both as
embracing “general principles of tort law,” and as critically important to the
U.S. government’s battle against terrorism. 10 This marriage of tort law and
the War on Terror has, however, transformed Section 2333 into anything

that courts’ reach to all American victims of overseas terrorism. See H.R. REP. 102-1040, at 5 (1992)
(noting need for civil statute providing general cause of action for American victims of international
terrorism).
7.
There are two additional material support statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 2339C, which was added to
the ATA in 2002 and prohibits the financing of terrorism; and 18 U.S.C. § 2339D, which was added in
2004 and makes it illegal to receive military training from a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization
(FTO). A search conducted in August 2018 showed no civil cases involving Section 2339D. While
Section 2339C has been more frequently invoked, examining these cases is beyond the scope of this
Article.
8.
See infra Part II.A for the ATA’s definition of “material support.” Like Section 2333,
Sections 2339A and 2399B were enacted before September 11th, but largely remained dormant until
after the attacks. Since then, the government has used both statutes to aggressively prosecute so-called
terrorist supporters. Abrams, supra note 2, at 5–6.
9.
See Boim v. Quranic Literary Inst. and Holy Land Found., 291 F.3d 1000, 1015 (7th Cir.
2002) [hereinafter Boim I] (concluding that Section 2333 claims can be based on underlying violations
of Sections 2339A and 2339B, which constitute acts of “international terrorism”). But see Linde v. Arab
Bank, PLC, 882 F.3d 314, 326 (2d Cir. 2018) [hereinafter Linde III] (holding that material support does
not “invariably equate to an act of international terrorism” and only qualifies as such upon a showing
that it “involve[d] violence or endanger[ed] human life,” appears “intended to intimidate or coerce a
civilian population or to influence or affect a government,” and “occurred primarily outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States or transcend[ed] national boundaries.”). Defendants do not need to be
convicted under Sections 2339A and 2399B, in order to be sued under the civil material support statute.
Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1015.
10.
See, e.g., Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 474, 484, 496 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) [hereinafter
Gill II] (acknowledging that Section 2333 incorporates “general principles of tort law,” but that the
statute must be interpreted to serve the struggle against terrorism).
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but the typical tort Congress intended it to be.11 Its byproduct is a line of
jurisprudence that carries negative implications for the discipline of torts
writ large, reinforces the War on Terror’s politically-infused narratives
about the nature of terrorism, itself, and often ensnares defendants with little
to no meaningful connection to terrorism or terrorist groups.
These dynamics, which have been steadily developing since 9/11, have
gone largely unnoticed by both tort scholars and critics of U.S.
counterterrorism efforts. They are, however, critically important. They
highlight how the War on Terror is undermining not just public, but also
private, law, underscore how particular views about terrorism, grounded
more in ideology than empirics, are facilitating this process, and
demonstrate how private law, specifically torts, is helping to further that
normative position. This Article seeks to uncover and explain these trends,
for the first time, and offer some preliminary solutions.
At the heart of the War on Terror’s impact on tort law is Section 2333’s
evisceration of scienter and causation—two key components of any
intentional tort claim. Typically, to succeed on an intentional tort, plaintiff
must establish that defendant possessed two kinds of intention or “scienter”:
to both commit the act in question and bring about its consequences.12
Plaintiff must also show that defendant’s actions were causally connected
to her injury, as a matter of fact (“factual causation”) and law (“legal
causation”).13
When courts first began to interpret Section 2333, they applied most of
these traditional elements. Though nearly all courts took the radical step of
eliminating factual causation, most required that defendant possess both
kinds of scienter and satisfy the requirements of legal cause. As time passed,
however, many courts abandoned their commitment to these norms and
adopted more expansive approaches to the statute. While continuing to
describe Section 2333 as a traditional intentional tort,14 these courts began
to shy away from demanding that defendant intend both to commit the act

11.
The legislative history behind Section 2333 consistently describes the statute in traditional
tort law terms and makes no express claims to depart from those norms. See, e.g., Antiterrorism Act of
1990, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong. 136 (1990) (testimony of Joseph A. Morris) (legislative testimony on Section 2333
describing the statute as bringing “all of the substantive law of the American tort law system” to “focus
on the problem of terrorism”); id. (“Let us make all the tort law in the country available to see what we
can do to sort out these [terrorism] suits, all the doctrines of vicarious and shared liability, joint and
several liability, and so forth, and let us see if we can’t nail all the tort-feasors down the chain . . . .”).
12.
Craig M. Lawson, The Puzzle of Intended Harm in the Tort of Battery, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 355,
362 (2001)
13.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 33 cmt. e
(AM. LAW INST. 2010).
14.
Indeed, as discussed in Part I, courts have been very aware that Section 2333’s language and
legislative history demand the statute be construed in line with tort law norms.
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(providing material support to a terrorist organization or its activities) and
produce the consequences of the act (terrorist violence), and, instead,
required only that defendant possess mens rea, though arguably diminished,
for committing the act itself. A number of courts also effectively eliminated
legal causation in cases where support allegedly went directly to a terrorist
organization, its agents, or alter-egos (as opposed to another entity, like a
state sponsor of terrorism15).
By gutting the requirements of scienter and causation, Section 2333
jurisprudence has departed significantly from the norms of intentional tort
law16 in ways that cannot be explained by prevailing tort law theories.17 This
situation threatens to undermine tort law in several ways. First, it could have
a negative, long-term impact on tort law’s coherence and consistency. A
notoriously convoluted area, the discipline of torts is known for being less
than precise, particularly in defining basic concepts. With courts continuing
to describe Section 2333 as a typical intentional tort, while treating it
exceptionally, the statute’s unusual jurisprudence could exacerbate and fuel
existing confusion over the proper role of foundational elements, like
scienter and causation, in other kinds of intentional tort cases.
Second, Section 2333’s approach to scienter and causation blurs the
important line between criminal and tort law. 18 Indeed, one key reason why
Section 2333 cases defy tort norms is that, in interpreting the statute, courts
have relied heavily on the criminal material support laws. 19 This is likely
why causation, which is absent from the statutory language of Sections
2339A and 2339B, has been virtually eliminated from the civil statute. It is
most probably why the scienter inquiry in Section 2333 cases has evolved

15.
State sponsors of terrorism are those countries determined by the U.S. Secretary of State to
“have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.” See State Sponsors of Terrorism,
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, (last visited Sept. 12, 2018) https://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm [https://per
ma.cc/94F6-6Y86]. Currently, there are four state sponsors of terrorism: North Korea, Syria, Sudan, and
Iran. Id.
16.
As discussed in Part I.A, there is some debate over the role of scienter in certain intentional
tort cases, specifically with respect to the tort of battery. See infra note 47. There is, however, no
intentional tort that departs so dramatically from both scienter and causation norms as Section 2333.
17.
As described in Part I.B, the theories of tort are generally intended to do just this—describe
how tort laws work. Section 2333, however, defies these prevailing philosophies. See infra Part II.B.3.
18.
While it is not the only tort to upend this division, Section 2333 is a particularly extreme
example of this phenomenon. See infra Part III.B.
19.
Unlike most criminal laws, the criminal material support statutes have a lower liability
threshold than traditional intentional torts. This makes it problematic to import the criminal standard
into the civil side. As discussed in Part III.B, while this lower liability threshold is somewhat offset by
the higher burden of proof required in criminal cases, in torts, there is a lower evidentiary burden, which
provides no such backstop.
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to focus only on the act itself (and not its consequences), which is also a
feature of the criminal material support laws.20
The criminal law’s pervasive influence over Section 2333 jurisprudence
is closely connected to the War on Terror itself. A central component of that
war is the normative view that terrorism is existentially threatening to the
West, including the United States. In considering Section 2333 cases, many
courts have been implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, guided by this belief.
To address terrorism’s “unique” danger,21 these courts have looked beyond
Section 2333 to the criminal material support statutes’ legislative history,
which embraces this same ideological view on terrorism. Many of these
courts have relied on this history to justify loosening Section 2333’s liability
standards,22 thereby ensuring the civil statute reinforces a belief in
terrorism’s existential danger—a perspective with little to no empirical
support. 23
While the problems with Section 2333 jurisprudence are significant,
ameliorating them is straight forward. It involves situating the statute firmly
within tort law, resuscitating its nearly abandoned scienter and causation
elements, and ending interpretive reliance on criminal law and the War on
Terror. If this approach was adopted, Section 2333 would become the
traditional intentional tort it was always intended to be. This would also help
discourage tendencies to use the statute, which carries a high potential
damages award, to pursue deep-pocketed defendants with tenuous
connections to terrorism and terrorist organizations.
In discussing these various issues, this Article proceeds in four parts. Part
I explores how the War on Terror is undermining particular areas of public
law, such as constitutional, criminal, and immigration law and presents
Section 2333 cases as evidence of a similar phenomenon in private law,
specifically torts. To demonstrate how Section 2333 litigation is eroding tort
law, this section provides an operational overview of intentional tort law,
20.
As discussed below, while Section 2339A requires knowledge or intent to support terrorist
violence, Section 2339B does not. Neither Section 2339A nor 2339B require the actual occurrence of
terrorist violence. See infra Part II.A.
21.
See, e.g., Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 287, 326 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) [hereinafter
Linde II], vacated on other grounds by, 882 F.3d 314, 326 (2d Cir. 2018) (pointing to the importance of
“imped[ing] terrorism,” in interpreting Section 2333).
22.
For example, as discussed in Part IV.B, the courts have relied heavily on the legislative
history of Section 2339B to effectively eliminate legal causation from Section 2333 cases.
23.
Even if evidence existed that terrorism posed a unique and existential threat, this still would
not justify how courts have loosened Section 2333’s scienter and causation standards. Because Section
2333 calls for treble damages, courts have been clear that it must be classified as an intentional tort. See
infra Part II.B.1. Indeed, no court has explicitly argued that Section 2333 should be treated in any other
way, meaning scienter and causation are key elements of a claim. See Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1012 (noting
that nothing in Section 2333’s language or history justifies holding defendants liable for providing
material support to terrorist activities or groups, without both a showing of intentional action and
causation).
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focusing on the elements of scienter and causation, while also introducing
the prevailing theories of tort. Part II provides background on the
relationship between Section 2333 and the two criminal material support
statutes and examines how civil terrorism cases defy scienter and causation
norms, as well as dominant tort law theories. Part III explains why these
circumstances raise serious concerns for the discipline of torts, by looking
at the impact on tort law’s coherence and the criminal-tort divide. Part IV
highlights the ways Section 2333’s defiance of tort norms results from and
reinforces the ideology at the heart of the War on Terror. The Article
concludes by addressing potential solutions to the civil statute’s various
shortcomings.
Given their plaintiff-friendly character and large potential payouts,
Section 2333 cases will remain part of the legal lexicon for as long as
America’s fight against terrorism continues. Their negative consequences
will, as such, also endure. Ignoring and failing to address these effects
obscures the War on Terror’s pervasive and far-reaching influence on U.S.
law, and ensures it continues for the war’s duration, if not longer.
I. THE WAR ON TERROR IS UNDERMINING NOT JUST PUBLIC, BUT ALSO
PRIVATE, LAW
Much has been written about the War on Terror’s erosion of public law,
particularly in the areas of constitutional, criminal, and immigration law.
Scholars have, for example, examined constitutional concerns raised by the
criminal material support statutes.24 In particular, they have honed in on the
statutes’ broad definition of “material support” and shown how it threatens
paradigmatic free speech and association rights.25 Others have underscored
the criminal material support laws’ negative impact on religious freedom

24.
See, e.g., David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism,
38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L REV. 1, 10–15 (2003) (arguing that the government’s use of the criminal material
support laws, particularly Section 2339B, violates the First Amendment’s right to association).
25.
See id.; WADIE E. SAID, CRIMES OF TERROR: THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF
FEDERAL TERRORISM PROSECUTIONS 65–68 (2015) (discussing judicial interpretations of Section
2339B and their implications for free speech and association rights); Nikolas Abel, Note, United States
v. Mehanna, The First Amendment and Material Support in the War on Terror, 54 B.C. L. REV. 711
(2013) (arguing that Tarek Mehanna’s conviction for providing material support to Al Qaeda by
translating the group’s propaganda into English violated his First Amendment free speech rights).
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protections.26 Still others have raised alarm bells about the War on Terror’s
effects on Fourth Amendment privacy rights.27
In the area of criminal law, commentators have described the rise of a
“terrorism exceptionalism” that is purportedly toppling traditional
investigatory practices, notions of liability, due process protections, as well
as incarceration norms.28 As scholars recount, these transformations have
involved the rampant use of suspicion-less spying and informants; reliance
on laws, like Sections 2339A and 2339B, that criminalize activities, which
are not otherwise dangerous or directly linked to the commission of terrorist
violence;29 and the application of terrorism-specific sentencing
enhancements mandating exceedingly long prison terms for defendants. 30
In the immigration context, scholars have described how post-9/11
counterterrorism objectives have reshaped immigration policy.31 While
terrorism concerns played a role in immigration law before September
11th,32 they had a relatively minimal impact compared to the “near complete
. . . subordination of immigration and immigration policy to terrorism
policy” after the attacks.33 Indeed, since 9/11, purported concerns with
26.
See, e.g., Malick W. Ghachem, Religious Liberty and the Financial War on Terror, 12 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 139, 221 (2013) (arguing that the criminal material support laws sweep in “lawful as
well as illegal forms of Muslim belief and conduct, unduly narrowing our religious and political
discourse”).
27.
See, e.g., Erik Luna, The Bin Laden Exception, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1489 (2012) (arguing
that search procedures used at U.S. airports, which are based on “irrational” fears of terrorism, violate
Fourth Amendment protections).
28.
See generally S AID, supra note 25. Others have underscored the ways in which the War on
Crime set the stage for the criminal justice system’s approach to the War on Terror. See James Forman,
Jr., Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Helped Make the War on Terror Possible, 33 N.Y.U.
L. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 331, 339–40 (2009) (“[T]o understand why we as a nation have allowed
certain things to go on in our name, even, in some cases, after we learned the truth about abuses in the
war on terror . . . . we must pay careful attention to what we do at home, to our own citizens, in our
domestic criminal system.”). This argument has largely been presented as a “modification,” rather than
rejection, of the notion that the criminal justice system has taken an extreme approach to the War on
Terror. Id. at 335.
29.
SAID, supra note 25. Notably, “only a very small percentage of terrorism prosecutions have
reflected an actual security threat, due to the prevalence of the preventative use of § 2339B and relying
in great part on the work of informants.” Id. at 147.
30.
Id. at 122. As commentators have noted, since “the existence of an unrecognized terrorism
exception in criminal cases has no built-in barrier restricting that exception to prosecutions in which
terrorism-related crimes are charged,” these innovations could spill over into other areas of criminal law.
Id. at 146. As discussed below, there is at least some evidence suggesting these concerns are justified.
See infra Part III.A.
31.
Karen C. Tumlin, Suspect First: How Terrorism Policy Is Reshaping Immigration Policy, 92
CALIF. L. REV. 1173, 1176 (2004).
32.
Before 9/11, anyone who engaged in terrorist activity or was the representative or member
of a designated terrorist organization was excludable and removable from the United States. MICHAEL
J. GARCIA & RUTH E. WASEM, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, RL32564, IMMIGRATION:
TERRORIST GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION AND REMOVAL OF ALIENS (Jan. 12, 2010), https://fas.org/sgp/cr
s/homesec/RL32564.pdf [https://perma.cc/ME8E-53MK].
33.
Tumlin, supra note 31, at 1177.
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terrorism have led to a steep rise in ethnic and religious profiling in
immigration law enforcement and an increase in restrictive immigration
practices.34 These practices have impacted other areas of law, including
“undercut[ting] equal protection principles by selectively enforcing
immigration laws based on national origin and religion,” “erod[ing] the
traditional requirement of individual culpability in our criminal laws,” and
“promot[ing] guilt by association.” 35
The War on Terror’s distorting effects are not limited to these and other
branches of public law. Through Section 2333 of the ATA, U.S. terrorism
policy is also impacting private law, specifically torts.36 In passing Section
34.
See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Is Immigration Law National Security Law?, 66 EMORY L.J.
669, 672 (2017) (“The prominence of immigration in the national security debate [post-9/11] has . . .
legitimized a selective enforcement policy drawn along lines of race, religion, nationality, and
citizenship.”). These new immigration policies have disproportionately impacted individuals of Middle
Eastern, South Asian, and/or Muslim background. Shortly after 9/11, for example, the U.S. government
instituted several policies that specifically targeted immigrants from Muslim-majority countries. This
included sweeping up and detaining approximately 1200 immigrants, the majority of whom were from
countries with large Muslim populations. Tumlin, supra note 31, at 1197–1202. Most of these detainees
were never charged with any immigration or criminal law violation. Id. at 1202–03. In 2002, the
government created the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS), which required
males over the age of sixteen from twenty-five countries, twenty-four of which were Muslim-majority,
to report to local immigration offices for interviews. None of the men who came forward were ever
convicted of terrorism-related offenses. Wadhia, supra note 34, at 692. Instead, in return for voluntarily
complying with NSEERS, over 13,000 individuals were deported for technical violations of immigration
law. Tumlin, supra note 31, at 1188. The most recent and egregious example of the ethnic and religious
targeting of Muslim immigrants is, of course, the Muslim Ban first promulgated by the administration
of President Donald Trump on January 27, 2017, and subsequently revised and reissued several times.
See Amrit Cheng, The Muslim Ban: What Just Happened, ACLU (Dec. 6, 2017) (detailing history of
the Muslim Ban, including its various iterations and major developments in litigation challenging its
legality), https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/muslim-ban-what-just-happened [https://perma.
cc/MM3B-ZLLD].
35.
Tumlin, supra note 31, at 1193. The legal validity of these terrorism-related immigration
policies is hotly debated. Because of Congress’s plenary power over immigration, scholars have argued
that the federal government can lawfully discriminate on the basis of otherwise impermissible factors,
like race, ethnicity, religion, national origin, nationality, and political ideology. Shoba Sivaprasad
Wadhia, Business as Usual: Immigration and the National Security Exception, 114 PENN ST. L. REV.
1485, 1530 (2010). Still, the plenary power has limits, particularly when immigrants have significant
ties to the United States or are present within its borders. Tumlin, supra note 31, at 1183.
36.
Some commentators have praised Section 2333 precisely because of its relationship to the
War on Terror. See, e.g., Jack D. Smith & Gregory J. Cooper, Disrupting Terrorist Financing with Civil
Litigation, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 65, 66 (2009) (arguing that damages awards in private law suits,
including Section 2333 cases, may be “the most effective weapon of all against the spread of terrorism”);
John D. Shipman, Taking Terrorism to Court: A Legal Examination of the New Front in the War on
Terrorism, 86 N.C. L. REV. 526, 530 (2008) (arguing that private terrorism suits provide additional
disincentives for groups carrying out acts of international terrorism); Debra M. Strauss, Enlisting the
U.S. Courts in a New Front: Dismantling the International Business Holdings of Terrorist Groups
Through Federal Statutory and Common-Law Suits, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’ L L. 679 (2005) (calling on
private citizens to join the War on Terror by bringing lawsuits targeting the finances and financial
backers of terrorist groups, including under Section 2333); Stratton, supra note 3, at 54 (arguing that the
ATA’s civil provision adds an important weapon to “society’s arsenal to fight terrorism”). None of these
commentators has, however, explored how interpretations of Section 2333 have skewed tort law norms,
or the broad legal implications of this.
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2333, Congress made clear that the statute was to be treated as any other
tort law would be.37 But because the statutory language was so broad, courts
have been left to articulate the specific components of a Section 2333 claim
on their own. In a nod to the statute’s legislative history and treble damages
provision, courts have consistently described Section 2333 as an intentional
tort and claimed to apply the traditional elements of tort law in deciding
these cases.38 In practice, however, many courts have failed to treat Section
2333 as a typical tort provision. Instead, over time, they have gradually
undermined basic elements of tort law to ensure Section 2333 serves the
War on Terror’s interests, first and foremost.
To appreciate how judicial interpretations of the civil material support
statute depart from tort norms, it is necessary to understand the basic
elements of a typical intentional tort, as well as the dominant tort law
theories that explain how the discipline functions. The following section
provides this key background, beginning with an overview of intentional
tort law and focusing specifically on the role of scienter and causation. The
two main tort theories of economic and corrective justice are also discussed.
As will be demonstrated later, in Part II, Section 2333 veers from tort law
norms in ways that cannot be explained by either of the two prevailing
theories of tort.
A. Intentional Torts – Generally
Intentional torts are but one among several types of torts39 and are
themselves subdivided into various categories.40 Among these subdivisions
37.
The ATA’s legislative history establishes a clear connection between Section 2333 and tort
law. See 137 CONG. REC. S4,511-04 (daily ed. April 16, 1991) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (“The ATA
accords victims of terrorism the remedies of American tort law, including treble damages and attorney’s
fees”); Antiterrorism Act of 1990: Hearing on S. 2465 Before the Subcomm. On Courts and Admin.
Practice, 101st Cong. 136-37 (1992) (statement of Joseph A. Morris, former general counsel of the U.S.
Information Agency and the U.S. Office of Personnel Management) (“Let us make all the tort law in the
country available to see what we can do to sort out these [Section 2333] suits . . . and let us see if we
can’t nail all the tort-[] feasors down the chain, from the person who starts spending the money to the
person [who] actually pulls the trigger.”).
38.
See, e.g., Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 50 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding
that, in Section 2333 cases, “the ordinary tort requirements relating to fault, state of mind, causation,
and foreseeability must be satisfied for the plaintiff to obtain a judgment”).
39.
There are two other broad categories of torts: negligence and strict liability. A person is liable
in negligence, which is the most paradigmatic tort, where she fails to exercise the care of a reasonable
person and causes injury to another. KEITH N. HYLTON, TORT LAW: A MODERN PERSPECTIVE 112
(2016). Strict liability, on the other hand, does not depend upon fault, and is imposed without regard to
the defendant’s negligence or intent to cause harm. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 20 scope note (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
40.
Intentional torts are divided into three categories: intentional torts to persons, property, and
economic interests. Since Section 2333 is an intentional tort to persons, the remainder of this section
shall focus on that category. In discussing this topic, reference will be made to both the Restatement
(Second) and (Third) of Torts. This is necessary since parts of the Restatement (Third) of Torts,
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are the intentional torts to persons, which involve physical or emotional
harm or injury to individuals. An intentional tort to persons, which includes
Section 2333, has three prima facie elements: (1) scienter; (2) causation;
and (3) injury. Since the first two elements are most central to Section
2333’s jurisprudence,41 this section will focus on these components of an
intentional tort.
1. Intentional Torts – Scienter
Usually, to prove an intentional tort claim, plaintiff must show that
defendant had two types of scienter, or “dual intent”—namely, the scienter
to commit the act itself and bring about its consequences.42 For each of these
two categories, different degrees of scienter are required. Where the act is
concerned, only deliberate or volitional conduct is necessary.43 A person
must, in other words, have committed the act purposefully. When it comes
to the consequences of the act, the requirement is a bit more complex. While
there is no need for “a hostile intent” or “desire to do any harm,” there must
be an intention to cause a result that will “invade the interests of another in
a way the law forbids.”44 This intention includes consequences that are both
desired, as well as those the actor knows are substantially certain to
happen.45 This latter type of awareness is sometimes referred to as
“conscious recklessness,” namely, the knowledge that an unreasonable risk
of harm would almost certainly, or at least very probably, happen, even if
defendant did not intend it. 46
including the volume on Intentional Torts to Persons, has not been fully finalized. In accordance with
the desires of the (Third) Restatement’s publishers, if a particular tort principle is still in draft form, the
(Second) Restatement’s language will be cited instead. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM intro. note.
41.
Injury is typically straightforward in the Section 2333 context.
42.
See Lawson, supra note 12, at 362 (“One of the most common general observations about
intent required for an intentional tort is that it refers not only to a purpose to act, but also—and
primarily—to a purpose to cause certain consequences through one’s act.”).
43.
Deliberate or volitional conduct is that which outwardly manifests defendant’s will.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see also James A. Henderson, Jr.
& Aaron D. Twerski, Intent and Recklessness in Tort: The Practical Craft of Restating Law, 54 VAND.
L. REV. 1133, 1137 (2001) (describing “volition” as the appropriate mens rea requirement for the act
itself).
44.
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 8 (5th ed. 1984).
45.
This concept is captured by the definition of intent in the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
A person acts with the intent to produce a consequence if:
(a) The person acts with the purpose of producing that consequence; or
(b) The person acts knowing that the consequence is substantially certain to result.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 1. As the Restatement
also notes, however, “purpose” clearly provides a “stronger basis for liability.” Id. § 1 cmt. a.
46.
Peter Cane, Mens Rea in Tort Law, 20 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 533, 537 (2000). To
qualify as “intent,” conscious recklessness requires both substantial certainty that a certain consequence
will occur and actual knowledge by the actor of this risk. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 44, § 8 (noting
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Showing that defendant had the requisite scienter to bring about the
consequences of her actions is an important element of an intentional tort
claim.47 It has consistently been part of various paradigmatic intentional
torts, like assault,48 fraudulent misrepresentation, 49 false imprisonment, 50
and intentional infliction of emotional distress.51 This desire to cause or
conscious indifference to doing harm is a stronger basis for liability relative
that “the mere knowledge and appreciation of a risk—something short of substantial certainty—is not
intent”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 1 cmt c.
(“[A] mere showing that harm is substantially certain to result from the actor’s conduct is not sufficient
to prove intent; it must also be shown that the actor is aware of this”). For the remainder of this Article,
I will refer to “intent” and “conscious recklessness” as separate concepts, even though they are usually
treated synonymously. See supra note 45.
47.
Pointing primarily to the tort of battery, some have suggested that intentional torts do not
always require intent both to commit the act and cause its consequences. See, e.g., HYLTON, supra note
39, at 89 (drawing distinction between intentional torts, like battery, which only require an “intent to
execute the act” and other intentional torts that require both an intent to execute the act and an “intent to
harm”). There is, however, substantial disagreement, both in case law and scholarly commentary, over
the issue. See Nancy J. Moore, Intent and Consent in the Tort of Battery: Confusion and Controversy,
61 AM. U. L. REV. 1585 (2012) (examining the judicial and scholarly split over whether battery is a dual
intent tort and explaining that dual intent supporters have the better argument, based on the definition of
both battery and intent in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the concept of conscious recklessness, as
well as tort laws preference for sanctioning behaviors involving some level of fault); see also infra note
234 (noting that, even among those who argue for single-intent, some believe a certain level of fault is
required for the consequences of battery); infra note 233 (observing that the historical development of
the law of intentional torts also displays a trend in favor of the dual-intent view). But see Kenneth W.
Simons, A Restatement (Third) of Intentional Torts?, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1061 (2006) (noting judicial split
between a dual- and single-intent view of battery and arguing in favor of the single-intent view). Even
conceding that battery may not always require “intent to do harm,” this view has typically been limited
to situations where “the defendant has diminished capacity such that the defendant herself might not
have intended harm or offense from conduct that a reasonable person would recognize was destined to
produce it.” Ellen M. Bublick, A Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Intentional Harm to
Persons—Thoughts, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1335, 1343 n.45 (2009).
48.
See, e.g., Garcia v. U.S., 826 F.2d 806, 809 n.9 (9th Cir. 1987) (“A person commits the tort
of assault if he acts with intent to cause another harmful or offensive contact or apprehension thereof,
and the other person apprehends imminent contact.”).
49.
See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. O’Donnell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 822 F.3d 650, 658 (2d
Cir. 2016) (“It is emphatically the case—and has been for more than a century—that a representation is
fraudulent only if made with the contemporaneous intent to defraud—i.e., the statement was knowingly
or recklessly false and made with the intent to induce harmful reliance.”).
50.
While false imprisonment does not require that defendant intend the imprisonment, itself, be
extralegal, it does require his awareness of the consequences of his action—namely, the unwilling
confinement of another person. See Keith Hylton, Intent in Tort Law, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 1217, 1227
(2010) (noting that the intentional tort of false imprisonment requires not only volitional conduct but
also that defendant is aware of the “immediate physical consequences” of his actions); Cooper v. Dyke,
814 F.2d 941, 946 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that false imprisonment “does not depend on a formal arrest,
but rather on defendants’ manifest intent to take someone into custody and subject him to their control”).
51.
See, e.g., Pegg v. Herrnberger, 845 F.3d 112, 121–22 (4th Cir. 2017) (“Under West Virginia
law, to establish the tort of . . . intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must establish
four elements: (1) that the defendant’s conduct was atrocious, intolerable, and so extreme and outrageous
as to exceed the bounds of decency; (2) that the defendant acted with the intent to inflict emotional
distress, or acted recklessly when it was certain or substantially certain emotional distress would result
from his conduct; (3) that the actions of the defendant caused the plaintiff to suffer emotional distress
and; (4) that the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was so severe that no reasonable person
could be expected to endure it.”) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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to other forms of culpability. 52 It is particularly important where treble or
punitive damages are available.53 The more malicious and outrageous the
defendant’s desire to cause injury, the more likely courts are to award these
elevated damages amounts.54
2. Intentional Torts – Causation
Establishing a causal connection between conduct and harm ensures only
those who “by intervening in the world, have changed the course of events
for the worse” are held liable for their actions.55 In torts, causation generally
has two elements: factual causation56 and legal causation.57 Typically,
plaintiff must establish both types of cause, to prevail on a tort claim.58
Factual causation requires plaintiff show defendant brought about her
injury, as a matter of fact. 59 According to this requirement’s most common
formulation, a defendant is not liable, if plaintiff’s injury would have been
equally likely to occur in the absence of her actions.60 Legal causation, on
the other hand, focuses on the issue of foreseeability—if plaintiff’s injury
was not a foreseeable consequence of defendant’s conduct, then defendant
52.
The liability standard for intentional torts is higher than for negligence, which only requires
defendant act unreasonably in breaching her duty of care, or strict liability torts, which do not require
any fault at all. Cane, supra note 46, at 546.
53.
Id. at 546–48. Treble damages are considered punitive in nature. Gill II, 893 F. Supp. 2d at
503.
54.
1 Linda L. Schlueter, Punitive Damages § 9.2(A) (7th ed. 2015) (observing that, with respect
to assault and battery, “[m]ost jurisdictions permit a jury to consider an award of punitive damages . . .
[only] when attended by certain aggravating elements, such as malice, recklessness, insult, or
oppression”).
55.
Tony Honoré, Necessary and Sufficient Conditions in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 363, 385 (David Owen ed., 1995).
56.
Factual causation is also referred to as “but for” causation. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 cmt. b (AM. LAW I NST. 2010). While I use
the former throughout this Article, the latter may also appear here in language quoted from judicial
opinions.
57.
Legal causation has alternatively been referred to as “proximate causation” and more
recently, in the Restatement (Third) of Torts, as “scope of liability.” All of these phrases have their
critics. See id. ch. 6, special note on proximate cause (explaining criticism of terms “proximate” and
“legal” cause); id. § 29 cmt. d (describing criticism of phrase “scope of liability”). This Article uses the
term legal causation since it provides the clearest terminological foil to factual cause. At the same time,
since many courts use “proximate causation,” that phrase also appears throughout this Article in various
quotations from case law.
58.
Id. § 33 & cmt. e.
59.
Id. § 26.
60.
Id. § 26 cmt. b. This approach to factual causation deselects for acts that are sufficient, but
not necessary, to plaintiff’s injury. As a result, it has been subject to much criticism and debate,
especially in joint tortfeasor cases, where each of two or more wrongful acts suffice to bring about harm,
but where neither is necessary. See Honoré, supra note 55, 364–67 (providing historical overview of
debates on meaning of necessary and sufficient conditions in causation). For this reason, as discussed
below, courts have relaxed the requirements of factual causation in joint tortfeasor cases. See infra note
306.
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did not legally cause her injury.61 This limitation ensures defendant is not
held liable for the “infinite stream of consequences” that may result from
her tortious action.62 The requirement may be relaxed, however, in
intentional tort cases.63 As the Restatement (Third) of Torts explains, “[a]n
actor who intentionally causes harm is subject to liability for that harm even
if it was unlikely to occur.”64 Even under this looser standard, an actor is
only liable where the risk of injury was increased by her conduct.65 And, of
course, she must still be the factual cause of plaintiff’s injury, 66 and have
dual intent.67
B. Theories of Tort Law
Theories of tort law provide a scaffolding for understanding existing tort
liability rules, developing new ones, and assessing whether these precepts
further tort law’s purpose. While there are various off-shoots, there are two

61.
HYLTON, supra note 39, at 100. Like factual causation, there has been much debate over what
legal causation requires. While foreseeability is not the only test that has been developed, most of the
alternative formulations are no longer in use or yield similar results. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 44,
§ 42 (describing some of the most prominent historical definitions of legal causation, many of which
have been abandoned by the courts); Peter Zablotsky, Mixing Oil and Water: Reconciling the Substantial
Factor and Results-Within-The-Risk Approaches to Proximate Cause, 26 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1003 (2008)
(arguing that cases using a substantial factor test, the other common approach to legal cause, yield the
same results as foreseeability). Notably, the Restatement (Third) of Torts eschews foreseeability and,
instead, limits liability to those harms arising from “risks” created by the tortious conduct. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 cmt. d (“[A]n
actor should be held liable only for harm that was among the potential harms—the risks—that made the
actor’s conduct tortious.”). Nevertheless, foreseeability remains, at least, rhetorically embraced by the
vast majority of courts, and is, therefore, the standard applied here. Id. § 29 cmt. e.
62.
Jane Stapleton, Legal Cause: Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences, 54
VAND. L. REV. 941, 1006 (2001).
63.
See, e.g., Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Services, Inc., 711 F.2d 1524, 1537 (11th Cir.
1983) (“While a negligent tortfeasor is responsible for all injuries which are proximately caused by his
tort, there is ‘extended liability’ for intentional torts and the rules of proximate causation are more
liberally applied than for mere negligence.”) (internal citation omitted).
64.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 33(a)
(AM. LAW INST. 2010).
65.
Id. § 33(c).
66.
Id. § 33 cmt. e.
67.
Id. § 33 cmt. a.
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main theories of tort, the economic and corrective justice theories, 68 which
shall be discussed here in turn.69
1. The Economic Theory of Tort Law
According to the economic theory, tort law is concerned with efficiently
allocating resources in the areas of safety and care. 70 Its primary aim is to
minimize the social cost of accidents.71 Deterrence is at the heart of the
economic theory of torts,72 and is based on the assumption that individuals
are “risk-neutral,” rational actors, 73 who will choose activities that
maximize economic utility. 74 If liability rules are efficient, then individuals
will be deterred from engaging in disfavored behavior, which is, by

68.
The economic and corrective justice theories of tort, which developed respectively in the
early 1960s and 70s, provide both normative and analytical explanations of tort law. Each theory,
however, favors one type of explanation over the other. In some circles, the economic theory is, for
example, considered more normative and reformist (because it seeks to improve tort law), than analytical
(it is supposedly less effective at explaining the actual state of tort law). Jules Coleman, Scott Hershovitz
& Gabriel Mendlow, Theories of the Common Law of Torts, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
§ 2.3.2, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/tort-theories (last updated Dec. 17, 2015). But see William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851 (1981)
(purporting to provide a positive account of the economic theory of tort that explains the way tort law
actually functions). By contrast, the corrective justice theory has been described as effectively analyzing
how tort law works in practice, though it also has a defined normative orientation. Theories of the
Common Law of Torts, supra, at § 3.1.
69.
There are, of course, many different variations and approaches to the two main theories of
tort law. It is, however, well beyond the scope of this Article to explore other iterations of the economic
and corrective theories of tort, or the disagreements over particular concepts within each school.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting two other prominent theories of tort law: civil recourse theory and
compensation theory. Both theories are more similar to the corrective justice, than law and economic,
camp. Civil recourse theory defines tort law as giving victims of legal wrongdoing opportunities to seek
remedies for their injuries. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L.
REV. 917, 976 (2010). For proponents of the compensation theory, tort law’s primary aim is to
compensate injured parties in ways that deter would-be injurers. Mark A. Geistfeld, Compensation as a
Tort Norm, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS 65, 66 (John Oberdeik ed., 2014).
70.
Landes & Posner, supra note 68, at 851. The economic theory is mostly focused on accidents
and, therefore, with the tort of negligence. Id. at 859.
71.
Id. at 868.
72.
John C. P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 547 (2003)
73.
Even though individuals are generally risk-averse, economic theorists argue that, because
accident insurance is available, tort law can realistically treat injurers and victims as being risk-neutral.
Landes & Posner, supra note 68, at 867–68. There is, however, a growing literature challenging this
risk-neutral, rational actor model, and exploring how the nuances of non-rational human behavior impact
the economic efficiency of liability rules. See, e.g., Hans-Bernd Schäfer & Frank Müller-Langer, Strict
Liability Versus Negligence, in TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS 3, 35–36 (Michael Faure ed., 2009)
(arguing that irrational human behavior, such as being overly optimistic or pessimistic about risks,
affects whether negligence or strict liability rules are more efficient in a given situation).
74.
Landes & Posner, supra note 68, at 864–72.
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definition, inefficient.75 In general, a liability rule is efficient if the cost of
the precaution is less than the expected injury.76
Under the economic theory of torts, causation plays a dubious role, at
best, in determining liability. The relationship between the injurer and
victim matters only to the extent it illuminates how accident costs can be
efficiently reduced.77 Indeed, as far as the founders of the economic theory
are concerned, causation, whether factual or legal, adds no value, in and of
itself, to liability assessments.78 Instead, it is the “least cost avoider” who
should always be treated as the guilty party.79 Unsurprisingly, the economic
theory of torts also defines intent in efficiency terms. Rather than focusing
on the injurer’s mental state and/or moral fault, the economic theory values
intent only to the extent defendant’s actions are “intentionally wrongful in
an economic sense.” 80 What this means, in effect, is that “the costs of
avoidance to the injurer are low relative to the social [costs] of the
activity.”81
2. The Corrective Justice Theory of Tort Law
Rather than locating tort law’s purpose in some external good, like
efficiency, corrective justice theory describes the discipline as driven by its
own internal rule of justice. According to this philosophy, tort law is guided
not by the social cost of harm, but by moral principles that aim to correct
injustices done by one actor to another. What matters to proponents of this
theory is that justice be done between the parties, without regard to society’s
broader welfare.82 In focusing on inter-relational fairness,83 the corrective
theory tries to determine whether the relationship between the parties should
75.
Id. at 857–58.
76.
Where a rule costs more than the injury, then, it violates the economic approach to tort law.
Id. at 857–58. The precise economics depends upon the species of tort liability involved. Coleman et al.,
supra note 68, §§2.1–2.2. Strict liability and negligence differ, for example, when it comes to
information costs—determining whether the injurer violated the liability rule—and claim costs—the
price associated with processing and collecting a legal claim. Landes & Posner, supra note 68, at 874–
75. The information costs are lower for strict liability torts, because there is no need to determine whether
the injurer acted with due care, while the claim costs are higher, because a claim arises every time there
is an injury. Id.
77.
Coleman et al., supra note 68, § 2.3.2.
78.
Omri Ben-Shahr, Causation and Foreseeability, in TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS 83, 84–85
(Michael Faure ed., 2009).
79.
Id. While generally rejecting the need for foreseeability, some economic theorists have
pushed back on the total evisceration of causation and insisted that factual cause is necessary to
determining socially optimal levels of care. See generally id. at 86–87. This argument, however, is
largely applied to strict liability torts only. Id. at 87–91.
80.
WILLIAMS A. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 181
(1987).
81.
Id. at 153.
82.
George Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 540–41 (1972).
83.
Ernest Weinrib, The Special Morality of Tort Law, 34 MCGILL L.J. 403, 408 (1989).
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be reversed.84 If justice requires undoing the transaction, then the party who
created the injury must compensate the injured party, in some way.85 In
other words, a tort remedy is only appropriate if plaintiff’s injury is causally
connected to defendant’s actions. Ernest Weinrib, one of the founding
fathers of corrective justice, has forcefully articulated this requirement: “In
bringing an action against the defendant, the plaintiff is asserting that the
two are connected as doer and sufferer of the same injustice. What the
defendant has done and what the plaintiff has suffered are not independent
events.” 86
As this formulation suggests, corrective justice requires a relationship of
both legal and factual cause between defendant’s actions and plaintiff’s
injury.87 It is this dual link that differentiates the fortuitous from the morally
culpable wrong, with which corrective justice is concerned. 88 This sense of
moral blameworthiness also infuses the theory’s approach to intent.
According to proponents of corrective justice, one intends to do an act only
where one is trying to “bring about something.” 89 Where the harm one is
attempting to “bring about” is to a person or property, “one is shaping
oneself as one who, in the most straightforward way, exploits others.”90 The
existence of real or actual intent, as opposed to conscious recklessness, is
particularly important here, since the former is more morally meaningful
and significant.91
Against this backdrop of intentional tort norms and explanatory tort
theories, Section 2333 stands apart, as explored in Part II, below. As that
section demonstrates, Section 2333’s interpretation has gradually distorted
the statute’s scienter and causation elements, in ways that fail to comport
with the economic and corrective theories of tort law.

84.
John Gardner, What Is Tort Law For? Part I. The Place of Corrective Justice, 30 L. & PHIL.
1, 9–10 (2011).
85.
Id. at 18–19.
86.
Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice in a Nutshell, 52 U. OF TORONTO L.J. 349, 350 (2002).
87.
As at least one commentator has noted, “[i]t is difficult to see . . . how a test for causation
which completely eschews any necessity requirement [equivalent to a but for test] . . . can be compatible
with the corrective justice [theory] . . . .” SARAH GREEN, CAUSATION IN NEGLIGENCE 29 (2015).
88.
Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI-KENT L. REV. 407, 408 (1987).
Closely related to corrective justice, the civil recourse and compensation theories of tort also treat
causation as critical to liability, though the concept carries no moral significance under these other
approaches. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92 CORNELL
L. REV. 1123, 1127 (2007) (describing causation as necessary to determining when victims are entitled
to take legal action against wrongdoers); Geistfeld, supra note 69, at 72 (“The occurrence of foreseeable
injury, not any moral shortcoming in the behavior itself, . . . trigger[s] the obligation to pay compensatory
damages.”).
89.
John Finnis, Intention in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 229, 229
(David G. Owen ed., 1995).
90.
Id. at 244.
91.
Id. at 242–47.
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II. SECTION 2333 AS AN EXCEPTIONAL INTENTIONAL TORT
Section 2333 cases have departed from intentional tort law norms by
overly focusing on and, in some cases, substantially loosening the scienter
required for doing the act (providing material support), effectively
nullifying a scienter requirement when it comes to the consequences of the
act (terrorist violence), eliminating factual causation, and quietly removing
any requirement of legal cause, where support has allegedly gone to a
terrorist organization, its agents, or alter-egos. Neither the economic nor
corrective justice theories fully or satisfactorily explain why Section 2333
cases have evolved in these ways.
Before delving into this discussion, and to further foreground the
analysis, the first part of this section provides basic background on the
relationship between Section 2333 and the two criminal material support
statutes, 2339A and 2339B. As will be explored in the second half of this
section, and more thoroughly in Parts III and IV, these criminal statutes have
helped broaden Section 2333’s liability scheme to serve a particular political
ideology, at the heart of the War on Terror.
A. Background on the Criminal Material Support Statutes
While Section 2333 has been part of the ATA since it was first enacted
in 1992,92 Sections 2339A and 2339B were added later, in 199493 and
1996,94 respectively.95 Nearly all Section 2333 cases, brought thus far,
involve underlying, alleged violations of at least one (and usually both)
criminal statutes.
Section 2339A prohibits the provision of material support in aid of
terrorist acts. Under this law, “[w]hoever provides material support or
resources or conceals or disguises the nature, location, source, or ownership
of material support or resources, knowing or intending that they are to be
92.
Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 1003, 106 Stat. 4506,
4522.
93.
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 120005,
108 Stat. 2022, 2022.
94.
See Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 303,
110 Stat. 1214, 1250 (1996). AEDPA also amended Section 2339A to enlarge the predicate offenses
covered by that title and eliminate restrictions that existed on 2339A investigations. See id. § 702.
95.
Sections 2339A and B have been amended several times since September 11th, through the
USA PATRIOT ACT, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 810(c)–(d), 811(d), 115 Stat. 380, 381 (2001); the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 6603, 118
Stat. 3638, 3762; the Human Rights Enforcement Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-122, §3(d), 123 Stat.
3480, 3481–82; the Statutory Time-Periods Technical Amendments Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-16,
§§3(6)–(8), 123 Stat. 1607, 1608; and the Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and
Ensuring Effective Discipline Over Monitoring Acts of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, tit. VII, §704, 129
Stat. 268, 300.
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used in preparation for, or in carrying out” a list of crimes associated with
terrorism or “attempts or conspires to do such an act” is guilty of violating
the statute.96 Upon enactment, Section 2339A was lambasted for being too
limited. Critics insisted the statute would make prosecutions difficult, by
requiring the government prove defendants had the intent or knowledge
their aid would support a particular terrorist crime. 97 To address this
perceived problem, Congress passed Section 2339B, 98 which prohibits
material support to designated foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) and
does not require a connection to terrorist activities, including violence.99
Under Section 2339B, “[w]hoever knowingly provides material support or
resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do
so” violates the statute.100
Under both laws, material support is defined as “any property, tangible
or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or
financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or
assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification,
communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances,
explosives, personnel (one or more individuals who may be or include
oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials.”101
While courts have acknowledged that terrorist groups often engage in lawful
activities which serve civilian and humanitarian ends, the ban on material
support applies to these initiatives, as well.102
As commentators have noted, both criminal statutes have effectively
turned what are secondary crimes, specifically aiding and abetting terrorism
or terrorist groups, into primary liability offenses.103 The statutes have also
96.
18. U.S.C. § 2339A(a).
97.
Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands of
Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 13 (2005); see also Wadie Said, The Material Support Prosecution
and Foreign Policy, 86 IND. L.J. 543, 556 (2011) (noting that 2339A “the provision criminalized material
support in aid of several enumerated crimes of violence, but did not deal with the purportedly pressing
problem of foreign terrorist groups raising money in the United States by way of appeals to humanitarian
aid”).
98.
Chesney, supra note 97, at 13. At the time it was introduced, Section 2339B was subject to
intense backlash, ranging from civil liberties concerns to claims that a wide-scale problem with terrorist
fundraising simply did not exist in the United States. Id. at 16–17. Because of these criticisms, 2339B
was initially removed from the House version of AEDPA. Id. at 17. It was, however, reintroduced, under
political pressure, on the first anniversary of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. Id. at 17.
99.
For the purposes of § 2339B, an FTO is an organization designated as a terrorist organization
under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Under Section 2339A, there is no
requirement that support go to an FTO.
100. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1).
101. 18. U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1).
102. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 29 (2010) (observing that Congress’s
repeal of an exception to Section 2339B for humanitarian aid to persons not directly involved in terrorist
activity demonstrates that “Congress considered and rejected the view that ostensibly peaceful aid would
have no harmful effects.”) [hereinafter HLP III].
103. Abrams, supra note 2, at 9–11.

https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss3/3

2018]

HOW THE WAR ON TERROR IS TRANSFORMING PRIVATE LAW

579

undone traditional features of complicity liability, including eschewing any
need for the substantive offense (terrorist violence) to be completed.104 This,
combined with the wide swath of prohibited conduct covered by the statutes,
has made Sections 2339A and 2339B handy tools for criminally prosecuting
individuals and entities, regardless of their proximity to terrorism or terrorist
groups or the dangerousness of their activities.105 Through Section 2333, the
criminal material support statutes have similarly empowered private parties
to pursue actors who have, at best, indirectly contributed to terrorist
violence or groups.106 Indeed, most Section 2333 cases have been brought
against third-party defendants which are several degrees removed from
terrorist organizations or violence and have often engaged in mundane acts
of “support.” A prototypical example of a Section 2333 case is a bank
accused of providing financial services to a charity which is allegedly
affiliated with a terrorist group that caused plaintiff’s injuries. Targeting
these third-parties is considered more effective than pursuing terrorist
organizations themselves, since the former are more likely to have
substantial, reachable assets.107
B. Section 2333’s Exceptionality
Notwithstanding Section 2333’s close relationship to the criminal
material support laws, courts have repeatedly and correctly described the
civil statute as a traditional tort. As they have observed, Section 2333
codifies “general common law tort principles” and extends “civil liability
for acts of international terrorism to the full reaches of traditional tort
104. Id. at 10–11, 11 n.24 (noting that, typically, an aiding and abetting charge requires completion
of the principal offense). Sections 2339A and 2339B have departed even further from traditional aiding
and abetting liability by transforming complicity from a minor offense to one that carries serious criminal
penalties and by failing to require the mens rea of purpose. Id. at 10–11.
105. This is particularly true of Section 2339B. See, e.g., S AID, supra note 25, at 71.
106. In Section 2333 cases, plaintiffs have raised claims for direct or primary violations of the
statute, as well as for secondary liability, in the form of aiding and abetting or conspiracy. Though most
cases have alleged both primary and secondary violations, this Article focuses only on primary liability
claims. For several reasons, judicial opinions on primary claims provide the most comprehensive view
of Section 2333’s evolution. First, there have been relatively fewer substantive decisions on aiding and
abetting and conspiracy claims, because, until recently, the law was unsettled as to whether secondary
liability was available under Section 2333. See Justice Against State Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L.
No. 114-222, § 4, 130 Stat. 852, 854 (2016) (amending Section 2333 to make aiding and abetting and
conspiracy liability available under the statute). Second, and, most importantly, on a theory of secondary
liability, defendants must satisfy the elements of an aiding and abetting or conspiracy claim, which are
different from the elements of a primary liability claim under Section 2333. See Owens v. BNP Paribas,
S.A., 897 F.3d 266, 277 (D.C. Cir. 2018); see also Freeman v. HSBC Holdings, PLC, No. 14-CV6601(DLI) (CLP), 2018 WL 3616845, at *14–22 (E.D.N.Y. July 27, 2018) (comparing and contrasting
elements of aiding and abetting and conspiracy liability under Section 2333 with elements of primary
liability under the statute). Since the focus of this Article is on the elements of Section 2333 itself,
primary liability claims are the most relevant and on point.
107. Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1021.
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law.”108 Despite this rhetorical commitment to tort norms, however, a
growing number of courts have upended basic tort requirements in deciding
Section 2333 cases and significantly expanded liability under the statute.
This defiance of tort doctrine developed over time. When courts first
started hearing Section 2333 claims, the traditional requirement that
defendant intend to commit the act (providing material support to a terrorist
organization or its activities) and its consequence (terrorist violence) was
maintained. Indeed, during these early days, courts defined scienter under
Section 2333 as requiring both intent and knowledge to commit the act and
its outcome.109 And while they did not require factual causation, courts still
demanded that defendant’s actions be the legal cause of plaintiff’s injury.
Gradually, however, many courts chiseled away at Section 2333’s
tortious elements. Focusing primarily on the deliberateness of the act itself,
a number of courts lowered the mens rea standard from intent to conscious
recklessness. As for the consequences of defendant’s actions, the vast
majority of courts eliminated a scienter requirement altogether. Finally,
some courts effectively eschewed legal causation where defendant’s support
allegedly went directly to a terrorist organization, its agents, or alter-egos.
Two decisions from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals have been at
the heart of this evolution: Boim v. Quranic Literary Institute and Holy Land
Foundation for Relief and Development, known as Boim I, which was
decided in 2002, and Boim III, a 2008 decision in the same litigation.110 Both
opinions have exerted substantial influence over other courts and how they
have approached scienter and causation under Section 2333. They also
represent opposite ends of the spectrum when it comes to interpretations of
the statute. While Boim I adopted a view on Section 2333 that is more
(though not wholly) in line with traditional approaches to scienter and
causation, Boim III embraced some of the most expansive views on these
concepts to date.
This section will begin by examining the development of Section 2333’s
scienter and causation elements and explore the ways they have expanded,
moving farther from Boim I and closer to Boim III. While there have been
exceptions to these trends, Section 2333’s scienter and causation elements
108. Id. at 1010.
109. Though the scienter requirement articulated by these early cases was relatively robust, even
these courts did not require plaintiffs to allege defendants specifically intended to cause their injuries, a
trend that has consistently been reflected in the case law. See Abecassis v. Wyatt, 704 F. Supp. 2d 623,
665 (S.D. Tex. 2010) [hereinafter Abecassis I] (canvassing the case law and concluding that “[a]ll the
courts apparently agree that [in Section 2333 cases] there is no need to allege that when a defendant
contributed money, it was aware of a particular planned attack or intended to further that attack”).
110. Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008) [hereinafter Boim
III]. There was a second Seventh Circuit decision in Boim, known as Boim II, which was vacated by
Boim III. Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 511 F.3d 707 (7th Cir. 2007) [hereinafter Boim
II], vacated en banc, 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008).
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have generally evolved in a more expansive direction. The section will
conclude by exploring how this evolution has failed to comport with tort
law norms and theories. Overall, this discussion sets the stage for Parts III
and IV, where Section 2333’s potentially negative impact on tort law is
discussed, along with the interrelated role played in the statute’s
development by the criminal material support laws and the War on Terror.
1. Section 2333’s Exceptional Scienter Requirement
Although Section 2333’s text does not include an explicit mens rea
element, courts have consistently held that scienter is required because of
the statute’s automatic treble damages award. 111 In articulating the specifics
of that mens rea requirement, courts have taken somewhat divergent routes.
Some have created an independent scienter element for the statute. Others
have simply imported Sections 2339A and 2339B’s mens rea. Still others
have combined the two approaches. Regardless of the route taken, however,
Section 2333’s scienter has been progressively loosened. As the law
currently stands, in many cases, plaintiff need only show that defendant
knew or consciously and recklessly disregarded the fact that she was
providing support to a terrorist group, whether directly or indirectly, and
need not prove defendant had the intent to support terrorist violence or
consciously and recklessly disregarded the risk her support would facilitate
such violence.
This section will explore the three avenues for defining Section 2333’s
mens rea and the similar ways in which the statute’s scienter requirement
has developed under each of these approaches.112

111. See, e.g., Boim III, 549 F.3d at 692 (“[W]e can assume that since section 2333 provides for
an automatic trebling of damages it would require proof of intentional misconduct . . . .”). The court’s
decision to treat the statute as an intentional tort is consistent with general tort doctrine, requiring a
heightened mens rea for punitive or treble damages awards. Keith N. Hylton, Intent in Tort Law, 44
VAL. U. L. REV. 1217, 1225–26 (2010). The courts have sanctioned departures from this standard only
where expressly intended by the legislature and reasonable. See, e.g., Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors,
672 A.2d 1190, 1205–07 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (holding that strict liability statute carrying
treble damages award did not offend the due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment where it was
clearly intended by legislature and driven by reasonable public policy concerns); Harris v. Manor
Healthcare Corp., 489 N.E. 2d 1374, 1381–83 (Ill. 1986) (holding that negligence statute carrying treble
damages award did not offend due process requirements where clearly intended by the legislature and
driven by reasonable public policy concerns).
112. The division between these three types of cases is often far from clear and neat. Nevertheless,
this tripartite framework most closely captures the analysis on Section 2333’s scienter requirement,
across and within jurisdictions.
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a. An Independent Scienter Requirement under Section 2333
The very first case to consider Section 2333 in any depth was also the
first to create an independent mens rea requirement for the statute.113 Boim
I involved claims relating to the murder of a U.S. citizen in May 1996 in
Israel, by two men who were purportedly members of Hamas.114 In their
complaint, the victim’s parents sued various U.S. charities and individuals
under Section 2333, for primary, as well as aiding and abetting, liability,
alleging defendants funneled money to Hamas in support of its terrorist
activities.115
In considering plaintiffs’ allegations, the court articulated the mens rea
required to maintain a Section 2333 action. As the court held, plaintiffs had
to establish that defendants deliberately engaged in an act of material
support, by “knowingly and intentionally suppl[ying] the funds to the
persons who committed the violent acts,” 116 and also demonstrate that
defendants “knew of Hamas’ illegal activities, that they desired to help those
activities succeed, and they engaged in some act of helping the illegal
activities.”117 To be liable under the statute, in other words, defendants
needed to have dual intent, first, to commit the act, and, second, to bring
about its consequences. The court explicitly rejected the notion that simply

113. Before the seminal decision of Boim I, it was unclear who could be sued under Section 2333
and for precisely what sort of activities. ORDE F. KITTRIE, LAWFARE: LAW AS A WEAPON OF WAR 55
(2016).
114. Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000. Hamas is a Palestinian group, with both military and political wings,
that was designated as a FTO in October 1997. U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country
Reports on Terrorism 2013 (April 2014) https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224829.htm [https://per
ma.cc/J8P9-VSKS].
115. Plaintiffs claimed that Hamas’s military wing depended on foreign money, with
“approximately one-third of its multi-million dollar annual budget coming from fund-raising in North
America and Western Europe.” Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1003. With respect to U.S. based-defendants,
Quranic Literacy Institute and the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, plaintiffs alleged
they were Hamas fronts, and that the “humanitarian functions” of the two NGOs, which were registered
as charitable organizations, “mask[ed] their core mission of raising and funneling money and other
resources to Hamas operatives in support of terrorist activities.” Id.
116. Id. at 1021 (emphasis added). Although this part of the court’s decision was made in the
context of plaintiffs’ aiding and abetting claim, its analysis arguably also applied to their claims of
primary liability under the statute. Id. at 1015. Indeed, other courts have interpreted Boim I’s scienter
analysis as relating to both primary and secondary liability under Section 2333. See Abecassis v. Wyatt,
785 F. Supp. 2d 614, 639–40 (S.D. Tex. 2011) [hereinafter Abecassis II] (describing Boim I as setting
“the standard for direct liability suits” under the ATA and requiring support be made “knowingly and
intentionally”); Rothstein v. UBS, AG, 647 F. Supp. 2d 292, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) [hereinafter Rothstein
I] (citing to Boim I, in holding that aiding and abetting theory, under Section 2333, requires that
defendant “knew that its funds would be used to sponsor terrorist acts by [terrorist organizations], but
also intended to do so”).
117. Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1023.
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providing funding to a terrorist organization, without any knowledge of its
violent activities, violated Section 2333. 118
Other early cases embraced Boim I’s scienter ruling. In a 2003 decision,
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held that, to have a
viable claim under Section 2333, plaintiffs must allege defendants had
knowledge and intent to further terrorist violence. Citing to Boim I, the court
observed that “[i]t is not funding by itself that constitutes international
terrorism . . . but funding provided with knowledge of and intent to further
violent acts. . . .” 119 In a 2005 decision, the District Court for the Southern
District of New York also adopted Boim I’s requirement and required
plaintiffs allege that defendants deliberately provided material support with
knowledge of the terrorist group’s violent activities and with intent to
further those acts.120
Then came Boim III, 121 which substantially departed from Boim I’s
approach to the necessary scienter for committing the act, as well as its
consequences.122 Unlike Boim I, the Boim III court did not require defendant
act with the purpose of providing material support to a terrorist group or its
activities. Instead, the court held that Section 2333 only required awareness
or conscious and reckless disregard of the fact that the organization, which
received the support, engaged in terrorism.123 A defendant did not even need
to know or intend that her money would ultimately reach a terrorist group.
The court also eliminated a mens rea for the consequences of defendant’s
actions. For the Boim III court, it did not matter how defendant intended her
118. Id. at 1012. As the court explained, “[t]o hold the defendants liable for donating money
without knowledge of the donee’s intended criminal use of the funds would impose strict liability,” a
result that was not supported by the language of the statute or its legislative history. Id.
119. Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 86, 106 (D.D.C. 2003) (citing to
Boim I).
120. In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 828 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(citing Boim I) (“To adequately plead the provision of material support under this section, a plaintiff
would have to allege that the defendant knew about the terrorists’ illegal activities, the defendant desired
to help those activities succeed, and the defendant engaged in some act of helping those activities.”).
121. After issuing its decision in Boim I, the appellate court remanded the case to the district court,
which awarded hundreds of millions of dollars to plaintiffs in 2004. Matt O’Connor, $156 Million Award
in Terrorist Killing, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Dec. 9, 2004), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2004-12-09/n
ews/0412090101_1_anti-terrorism-texas-based-holy-land-foundation-david-boim [https://perma.cc/JB
M7-GWSN]. Defendants appealed the decision to the Seventh Circuit which issued a decision in Boim
II, reversing the lower court’s award. Plaintiffs moved for a rehearing en banc, which was granted, and
resulted in the Boim III decision. Boim III, 549 F.3d at 688.
122. It is worth emphasizing that, even though it departed starkly from Boim I, the Boim III court
did not dispute Section 2333’s status as an intentional tort. Id. at 692.
123. Id. at 693. Some courts have suggested that Boim III both established an independent scienter
standard and required that the mens rea for the underlying criminal statutes be satisfied. See Gill I, 891
F. Supp. 2d at 365 (arguing that Boim III “conceded the applicability of [the criminal material support]
statutes’ scienter requirements” in Section 2333 cases). While Boim III does allude to satisfying the
criminal mens rea standards, the court ultimately defined scienter under Section 2333 as exclusive and
independent of the criminal statutes underlying plaintiffs’ civil claims. 549 F.3d at 692.
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support be used, or, indeed, whether she specifically directed her funding to
non-violent activities. 124 As long as she was “reckless in failing to discover”
that her money would go to a terrorist entity, Section 2333’s scienter
requirement was satisfied in full.125
In short, to meet the civil statute’s mens rea requirement, Boim III
demanded only that defendant know or recklessly disregard the character of
the organization, which ultimately received her support, even if it was not
the organization she intended to help.126 No independent mens rea for the
consequences of her actions was required. In the court’s view, knowing or
deliberate indifference to the “terrorist” character of an organization
essentially amounted to knowledge or reckless indifference to the fact that
terrorist violence would most likely result from one’s assistance to that
group.127
In adopting this perspective, the Boim III court effectively collapsed the
scienter for the consequences of the act (terrorist violence) with the mens
rea for committing the act itself. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Ilana
Rovner, who wrote the Boim I decision,128 rejected this attempt to eliminate
scienter for the consequences of providing material support, arguing that it
was key to establishing a defendant’s culpability. 129
While many courts have since adopted Boim III’s scienter analysis,130
others have shared Judge Rovner’s concerns and concluded that “the limits
124. Id. at 698; see Abecassis I, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 658 (observing that Boim III does not require
that “defendant intend its contribution to be used for terrorist activities or even know that its contribution
specifically would be used for terrorism,” and that “defendant could ‘earmark’ its contribution for
humanitarian purposes and nonetheless be liable if it knew that the organization’s activities included
terrorism.”).
125. See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 702 (“Donor A gives to innocent-appearing organization B which
gives to innocent-appearing organization C which gives to Hamas. As long as A either knows or is
reckless in failing to discover that donations to B end up with Hamas, A is liable.”).
126. Id. at 695. As discussed in Part II.B.1.d, the court’s approach to conscious recklessness
arguably loosens even that mens rea standard.
127. See id. at 693 (“To give money to an organization that commits terrorist acts is not intentional
misconduct unless one either knows that the organization engages in such acts or is deliberately
indifferent to whether it does or not, meaning that one knows there is a substantial probability that the
organization engages in terrorism but one does not care.”).
128. To the extent it does not conflict with Boim III, Boim I remains good law in the Seventh
Circuit. Outside the circuit, courts have continued to rely on Boim I. In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc.,
Alien Tort Statute and Shareholder Derivative Litig., 690 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1309–10 (S.D. Fla. 2010)
[hereinafter Chiquita Brands I]; Rothstein I, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 295.
129. See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 706, 713 (Rovner, J., dissenting) (expressing concern about “just
how far the majority’s liability rule extends” and arguing that “proof of a donor’s intent to support
terrorism would help to confirm the donor’s culpability in instances where the terrorist nature of the
organization receiving aid is less clear than it would be if a donor were making out a check payable to
Hamas”).
130. In Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, SA, the district court cited to Boim III in holding that plaintiffs
could prevail on their Section 2333 claim, as long as they showed defendant knew or was deliberately
indifferent to the fact that a charity to which it provided banking services was supporting terrorist
organizations. 925 F. Supp. 2d 414, 428 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) [hereinafter Strauss II]; see Linde II, 97 F.
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of liability are unclear under [Boim III], which removes . . . an intent, or
purpose, or knowledge requirement and only demands awareness that the
organization that ends up receiving the funds is a terrorist group.”131
But even for those courts troubled by Boim III, the needle has moved far
from Boim I. In a 2010 decision in Abecassis v. Wyatt (“Abecassis I”), for
example, the court rejected Boim III’s holding but still adopted a scienter
requirement that was closer to that decision than to Boim I’s mens rea
analysis.132 In its opinion, the Abecassis I court defined scienter as
demanding only that defendant “know (or intend) that its money is going to
a group engaged in terrorist acts or is being used to support terrorist acts.” 133
Though it stopped short of adopting Boim III’s conscious recklessness
standard, the Abecassis I court eschewed any requirement that defendant
independently possess scienter, of some kind, for the consequences of her
actions.
b. Importing Scienter from the Criminal Material Support Statutes
Though the Abecassis I court articulated an independent scienter
requirement for Section 2333, its approach was influenced, in part, by the
scienter requirements for Sections 2339A and 2339B. 134 Going even further
than Abecassis I, some courts have wholeheartedly adopted the criminal
statutes’ mens rea standards in lieu of developing an independent scienter
requirement for Section 2333.135 In the process, they have come far closer
to Boim III’s, than to Boim I’s, approach to Section 2333 mens rea and, in

Supp. 3d at 331 (“An organization’s knowing provision of material support to a terrorist organization
(or its deliberate indifference as to whether or not it provided material support to a terrorist organization)
qualifies as intentional misconduct” under Section 2333).
131. Abecassis I, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 664.
132. Id. In Abecassis I, survivors and heirs of those killed in various suicide bombings in Israel
brought claims, including under Section 2333, accusing defendants of financing terrorism by illegally
purchasing oil from then-Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein. Id. at 626–27. Defendants were various U.S.
companies and individuals involved in the oil business. Id. at 627. Plaintiffs claimed these entities and
individuals purchased oil from Iraq, either directly from the government or through third-parties. Id.
This money was then purportedly used by the Iraqi state to make “reward payments” to the families of
suicide bombers and others killed in carrying out terrorist attacks. According to plaintiffs, these
payments “were important to recruiting terrorists,” thereby creating liability for defendants under
Section 2333. Id.
133. Id. at 664 (emphasis added).
134. Because the criminal statutes do not demand both knowledge and intent, the Abecassis I court
held that Section 2333 also had no such requirement. Id.
135. See, e.g., Hussein v. Dahabshiil Transfer Servs. Ltd., 230 F. Supp. 3d 167, 171 (S.D.N.Y.
2017) (“Because the material support statutes require the same (or a greater) showing of mens rea than
does Section 2333(a), a plausible allegation of a violation of the material support provisions establishes
both ‘unlawful action’ and scienter for purposes of Section 2333(a).”).
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some cases, have even loosened the scienter requirement for the criminal
statutes themselves. 136
i. Importing Section 2339B’s Mens Rea Standard
Where Section 2339B has been implicated, a number of courts hearing
civil material support cases have relied exclusively on the criminal statute’s
mens rea requirement.137 In these matters, the Humanitarian Law Project
(“HLP”) litigation, which definitively established 2339B’s scienter
requirement, has been particularly influential.138 Although HLP neither
involved nor discussed Section 2333, examining the relationship between
the HLP case law and Section 2333 jurisprudence illuminates how 2339B’s
mens rea has been used in the civil context to eschew any requirement that
defendant possess mens rea for the consequences of her actions.
The HLP litigation began a few years before September 11th when
several plaintiffs filed a complaint, seeking to prevent the U.S. government
from prospectively prosecuting them for violating Section 2339B.139
Plaintiffs sought to support the non-violent political and humanitarian
activities of two designated FTOs, 140 but had refrained from doing so
because they feared federal prosecution under the criminal statute.141 In
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief preventing their prosecution,
plaintiffs brought various constitutional challenges to Section 2339B,
including under the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause for failure to

136. There appears to be a mutually corrosive relationship between Sections 2339A and 2339B,
and the Boim III decision. While the criminal material support statutes have had a substantial impact on
expanding Section 2333’s scienter, the Boim III case has, in some instances, served to loosen the mens
rea standard for the criminal statutes, in the civil context. See, infra note 152.
137. See, e.g., Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org., 60 F. Supp. 3d 509, 521–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(Section 2333 case relying on Section 2339B’s scienter requirement); Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A.,
CV-06-0702 (CPA), 2006 WL 2862704, at *9–13 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2006) [hereinafter Strauss I] (same).
138. Ghachem, supra note 26, at 162 (observing that the HLP decisions have woven their way
“through both civil and criminal cases” involving material support).
139. Plaintiffs filed their complaint on March 19, 1998. Humanitarian Law Project v. Dep’t of
Justice, 352 F.3d 382, 392 (9th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter HLP II], vacated on other grounds by 393 F.3d
902 (9th Cir. 2004).
140. In the HLP case, some plaintiffs hoped to support the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in
Turkey, while others wanted to support the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. Both
the PKK and the LTTE “engaged in a broad range of activities, from terrorist violence to peaceful
political advocacy to humanitarian aid.” HLP II, 352 F.3d at 388.
141. Before Section 2339B was enacted, lead plaintiff, Humanitarian Law Project, had provided
various types of support to the PKK. Id. at 389–90. In moving for an injunction, the group aimed to
resume its support for the group, including advocating on its behalf before the United Nations, training
PKK members on political advocacy techniques and international law, and providing housing to PKK
members in connection with those activities. Id. at 390. As for the LTTE, various plaintiffs claimed that,
but for fear of prosecution under Section 2339B, they would support the LTTE’s peaceful efforts to
promote the human rights and well-being of Sri Lanka’s Tamil population. Id. at 391.
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require proof of “personal guilt.” 142 In a 2003 decision, the Ninth Circuit
rejected plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claim and concluded that Section
2339B already required personal culpability. According to the court, in
order to violate the statute, defendant had to either know an organization
was a designated terrorist group or that it engaged in terrorist activities.143
Soon after this decision, some courts hearing Section 2333 cases began
adopting this mens rea standard in suits implicating Section 2339B. In line
with the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, these courts required only that defendant
knowingly provide material support to a terrorist group, in order to satisfy
Section 2333’s scienter element.144
In 2004, Congress amended Section 2339B to codify the Ninth Circuit’s
mens rea holding. Under this amendment, in order to violate 2339B, “a
person must have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist
organization . . . that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist
activity . . . or that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism. . .
.”145 Despite this change, the HLP plaintiffs continued to challenge 2339B’s
constitutionality. In 2010, the Supreme Court weighed in on the dispute and
addressed whether 2339B required that defendant intend to support terrorist
violence.146 As the Supreme Court held, a violation of the statute did not
require such intent. Citing to the 2004 amendment, the Court held that
“Congress plainly spoke to the necessary mental state for a violation of
Section 2339B and it chose knowledge about the organization’s connection
to terrorism, not specific intent to further the organization’s [violent]
terrorist activities.” 147

142. Id. at 392 (citing Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 224–28 (1961)). Specifically,
plaintiffs argued that Section 2339B “runs afoul of the Fifth Amendment’s right to due process of law
because the statute does not require proof that a person charged with violating the statute had a guilty
intent when he or she provided ‘material support’ to a designated organization.” Id. at 394. In addition
to their Fifth Amendment claim, plaintiffs argued that Section 2339B violated their freedom of
association and speech under the First Amendment. Id. at 393. In a decision issued in 2000, the Ninth
Circuit rejected these arguments. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1133–36 (9th Cir.
2000) [hereinafter HLP I].
143. HLP II, 352 F.3d at 400.
144. See, e.g., Strauss I, 2006 WL 2862704, at *13–14 (Section 2333 case alleging violations of
Section 2339B, in which court adopted scienter requirement for criminal statute and required only that
defendant knowingly provide material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization); Weiss v.
Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC, 453 F. Supp. 2d 609, 625 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) [hereinafter Weiss I] (same);
Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 586–88 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) [hereinafter Linde I] (same).
145. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), Pub. L. No. 108-458,
§ 6603, 118 Stat. 3638, 3764. According to various courts, “the amendment was not intended to change
the knowledge standard under 2339B, but only to clarify the standard which Congress had always
intended to apply.” Weiss I, 453 F. Supp. at 626 (citation omitted).
146. In their arguments to the court, plaintiffs claimed that, when applied to speech, 2339B mens
rea required that defendant intend to further a terrorist organization’s illegal activities. HLP III, 561 U.S.
at 16 (2010).
147. Id. at 16–17.
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For many courts, the Supreme Court’s decision in HLP III affirmed that
there was no mens rea requirement for the consequences of providing
material support in Section 2333 cases involving 2339B. Citing to the HLP
III decision, for example, the Second Circuit held that Section 2333
“incorporates the knowledge requirement from § 2339B(a)(1), which
prohibits the knowing provision of any material support to terrorist
organizations without regard to the types of activities supported. Its
application is not limited to the provision of support to the terrorist activities
of a terrorist organization.” 148
The Second Circuit, in fact, went even further than HLP III and expanded
the statute’s mens rea to include deliberate indifference to an organization’s
terrorist connections. Under this formulation, which is similar to Boim III’s
conscious recklessness standard, a civil defendant satisfies 2339B’s scienter
threshold where she either “has actual knowledge [that an organization
engages in terrorist activity] or if [she] exhibited deliberate indifference to
whether the organization engages in such activity.” 149 While not all Section
2333 courts have strayed this far afield,150 those that have directly
incorporated Section 2339B’s mens rea have consistently eschewed any
requirement that defendant possess scienter for the consequences of her
actions.
ii. Importing Section 2339A’s Mens Rea Standard
Like 2339B, 2339A’s mens rea has been directly incorporated into a
number of Section 2333 cases involving underlying violations of that
statute. In various instances, 2339A’s mens rea has been interpreted so
expansively that it has departed from its statutory language and become
more similar to 2339B. Overall, the trend in these cases exhibit the same
tendencies found in other Section 2333 litigation—a gradual evolution in

148. Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster Bank, PLC, 768 F.3d 202, 207–08 (2d Cir. 2014) [hereinafter
Weiss II].
149. Weiss II, 768 F.3d at 208 (emphasis added); see Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org., 60 F.
Supp. 3d 509, 521–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (Section 2333 case incorporating mens rea from Section 2339B
and defining the requirement as “actual knowledge of [terrorist] activity or . . . deliberate indifference
to whether the organization engages in such activity”) (citation and internal quotations omitted). Cf.
United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 129 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing to Supreme Court decision in HLP
III in holding that Section 2339B requires “defendant know the organization he is aiding is a terrorist
organization or engages in acts of terrorism”); Assi v. United States, No. 98-80695, 2015 WL 3680459,
at *3 (E.D. Mich. June 12, 2015) (holding that to sustain a conviction under Section 2339B it is enough
that “a defendant has acquired ‘knowledge’ through whatever means, that a specific organization has
engaged in terrorist activities”).
150. See, e.g., Stansell v. BGP, Inc., No. 8:09-cv-2501, 2011 WL 1296881, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Mar.
31, 2011) (describing Section 2339B’s mens rea as requiring defendant know the organization receiving
the material support was a terrorist group or engaged in terrorist activity).
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favor of eschewing intent for the consequences of providing material
support.
In the early days of civil material support litigation, cases incorporating
2339A’s scienter took a narrower approach. In a 2005 decision, for example,
the District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that Section
2339A required “knowledge or intent that the resources given to terrorists
are to be used in the commission of terrorist acts.”151 As the jurisprudence
developed, however, courts began to adopt a more liberal attitude toward
2339A. In these later decisions, 2339A’s scienter element was satisfied, as
long as defendant knew the organization she was supporting engaged in
terrorist activity, was a terrorist organization, or was supporting such
activities or organizations. 152 This requirement was so similar to 2339B’s
scienter component that, at times, the courts collapsed the mens rea for the
two criminal statutes into one another. 153
This approach to Section 2339A is clearly more expansive than criminal
interpretations of the statute, and effectively equates its mens rea with
knowingly providing support to organizations that engage in terrorism.154 In
151. Linde I, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 586 n.9 (emphasis added).
152. In Ofisi v. BNP Parisbas, S.A., the court transformed Section 2339A’s mens rea requirement
from its original definition of “provid[ing] material support or resources [to terrorists] . . . knowing or
intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out” terrorist activities to knowledge
that support was provided to an alter ego of a terrorist group or that the ultimate beneficiary was a
terrorist organization. 278 F. Supp. 3d 84, 100 (D.D.C. 2017), vacated in part, 285 F. Supp. 3d 240, 244
(D.D.C. 2018). Though Ofisi appears to adopt a hybrid approach to mens rea, the case is relevant here
because it primarily focuses on the scienter standard for the applicable criminal material support statutes
without exploring Section 2333’s separate mens rea requirement in much detail.
153. In Owens v. BNP Paribas S.A., the court defined Sections 2339A and 2339B mens rea
requirements in the same way:
[I]n order to satisfy the requirements of §§ 2339A or 2339B, plaintiffs must allege sufficient
facts to show either that (1) defendants knew Sudan was acting as an agent of al Qaeda or of an
individual terrorist; or (2) that defendants knew the ultimate beneficiaries of the financial
services would be a terrorist organization or terrorist.
235 F. Supp. 3d 85, 98–99 (D.D.C. 2017) [hereinafter Owens I], aff’d, 897 F.3d 266 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
Like Ofisi, Owens takes a hybrid approach to mens rea, but only discusses and applies the scienter
requirements for Sections 2339A and 2339B.
154. In a concurring opinion in Estate of Parsons v. Palestinian Auth., Judge Karen Henderson
noted the difference between interpretations of Section 2339A’s scienter requirement on the civil and
criminal sides:
Section 2339A criminalizes the provision of material support knowing or intending that such
support is used to aid crimes of terrorism. . . . The knowledge required to
violate section 2339A in the context of the ATA’s civil liability provision has [however] been
subject to debate. [In Boim III, ] [t]he Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, held that criminal
recklessness suffices.
651 F.3d 118, 127–28 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Henderson, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Judge Henderson
also noted that, unlike in the criminal context, Section 2333 cases involving an underlying violation of
Section 2339A only required defendant “know (or intend) that its money is going to a group engaged in
terrorist acts.” Id. at 128.
As Judge Henderson suggests, the Boim III decision, which involved underlying violations of
Section 2339A, seems to have had some impact on loosening the mens rea standard for the criminal
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so doing, it eliminates any need for plaintiff to independently establish that
defendant intended or was consciously and recklessly indifferent to
supporting terrorist violence.
c. A Hybrid Approach: Establishing Scienter under Both the Civil
and Criminal Statutes
Still other courts have held that Section 2333 claims have multiple
scienter requirements that must be met—one for the civil statute and one for
violations of each of the criminal material support laws implicated in the
case. Again, as with other Section 2333 cases, these suits have evolved in
favor of loosening the scienter standard to eliminate any mens rea for the
consequences of defendant’s actions.
In Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, for example, the court held that
Section 2333 “requires allegations of intentional misconduct—in addition
to other state-of-mind requirements incorporated in [the criminal material
support statutes]. . . .”155 In concluding that plaintiffs had adequately pled
violations of the predicate material support laws and also satisfied Section
2333’s separate mens rea requirement,156 the court strongly suggested that,
as long as defendant allegedly knew it was providing support to a terrorist
organization or its agent or alter-egos, all applicable mens rea elements were
satisfied.157
statute. Even though Boim III articulated an independent scienter requirement for Section 2333, some
courts have either implicitly or explicitly treated the court’s holding as applicable to Section 2339A’s
mens rea itself. See Chiquita Brands I, 690 F. Supp. 2d at 1312–13 (Section 2333 case quoting Boim III
in concluding that “[t]he mental element required to fix liability on a donor to [a terrorist organization]
[under Section 2339A] is . . . present if the donor knows the character of that organization [or consciously
avoids that knowledge]”). In Ahmad v. Christian Friends of Israeli Communities, a Section 2333 case
involving underlying violations of Section 2339A, the court held that the criminal statute provided the
applicable mens rea but defined that element in terms quite similar to Boim III. No. 13-civ-3376 (JMF),
2014 WL 1796322, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2014) (holding that to meet Section 2339A’s scienter
requirement “there must be some evidence—for instance, that the recipients of the aid have publicly
stated terrorist goals or are associates of established terrorist organizations”).
155. Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 42 (D.D.C. 2010) (emphasis added). In
Wultz, the court based its approach to mens rea on the belief that, in bringing a Section 2333 claim,
plaintiffs must affirmatively establish that an act of international terrorism had occurred. Id. at 43 (“[In
Section 2333 cases], plaintiffs must allege an act of international terrorism, which, in turn, requires that
plaintiffs allege . . . violations of [the criminal material support statutes]”). This rationale is co mmon
amongst courts taking a hybrid approach to Section 2333’s mens rea. See, e.g., Goldberg v. UBS AG,
660 F. Supp. 2d 410, 426–33 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
156. Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 44–48, 50.
157. Wultz arguably cuts both for and against a broad mens rea standard under Section 2333. On
the one hand, the court’s articulation of Section 2339A’s scienter requirement is consistent with the
statute’s wording and requires knowledge or intent to facilitate terrorist activities (as opposed to simply
knowing the character of the organization). Id. at 44–45. On the other hand, the court took a more
expansive approach to Section 2333’s “overarching” scienter requirement. Citing to Boim III, the court
held that the civil statute’s mens rea is satisfied where defendant knows it is providing material support
to a terrorist organization or its agent, thereby “risking the use of those funds in the furtherance of [the
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In Goldberg v. UBS AG, the court based its scienter analysis on whether
plaintiffs had adequately alleged that defendant possessed the requisite
mens rea for the underlying criminal material support statute, as well as for
Section 2333 itself.158 In concluding that all mens rea elements had been
satisfied,159 the court held that allegations defendant knew it was providing
material support to the agent of a terrorist group fulfilled each of the
applicable scienter standards.160
Like the independent mens rea cases, as well as those relying exclusively
on Sections 2339A and 2339B’s scienter requirements, in these hybrid
matters, as long as defendant knowingly supports a terrorist organization,
its agents, or alter-egos, she is potentially liable for violating the civil
material support statute.
d. Departing from Traditional Scienter Principles
Under the dominant scienter framework for Section 2333, plaintiff can
conceivably prevail against a defendant, without showing the latter actually
intended to provide material support to terrorist activities. If defendant
donated money to a third party allegedly affiliated with a terrorist group,
she does not need to desire her money be used to support the terrorist
organization or its initiatives. To satisfy the scienter requirement, defendant
simply needs to have knowingly supported, or, in some cases, consciously
and recklessly disregarded the risk that her support would ultimately reach
an organization that was a designated terrorist group, engaged in terrorist
activity, or itself supported terrorists.161 In effect, plaintiffs have been freed
of the need to allege or prove that defendants intended or consciously and
terrorist organization’s] terrorist attacks.” Id. at 50. In Wultz, plaintiffs alleged defendant had knowingly
provided material support to the agent of a terrorist organization and, quite unusually, presented specific
allegations that defendant was likely aware its support would further terrorism. Id. at 44–48, 50–52. On
these allegations, plaintiffs satisfied both the higher scienter threshold for Section 2339A and the lower
standard for Section 2333. Nevertheless, given the court’s observation that as long as defendant “knew
that it was providing financial services to the [agent of a terrorist organization] and continued to do so,
defendant engaged in the sort of intentional misconduct prohibited” by Section 2333, it is conceivable
the court would have been satisfied with a weaker scienter showing, if there had been no specific
allegations defendant possessed mens rea for the consequences of its actions. Id. at 52.
158. Goldberg, 660 F. Supp. 2d at 426–33.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 428, 433. In In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., the court similarly held that Section 2333
had multiple mens rea requirements, including to establish an “act of international terrorism” had
occurred under the civil statute itself, as well as for the underlying criminal material support provision.
284 F. Supp. 3d 1284, 1307 (S.D. Fla. 2018) [hereinafter Chiquita Brands II]. In that case, which
involved an underlying violation of Section 2339A, the court held that all mens rea requirements could
be satisfied “[w]here support is given to a known terrorist group having only violent organizational
goals.” Id. at 1320.
161. Boim III, 549 F.3d at 702; Strauss v. Crédit Lyonnais, SA, 925 F. Supp. 2d 414, 429 (E.D.N.Y.
2013) [hereinafter Strauss II].
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recklessly disregarded the risk that their actions would contribute to terrorist
violence.
For several reasons, this scienter standard fails to comport with
traditional tort principles. First, because Section 2333 cases focus
exclusively on the act itself, they stand in stark contrast to the typical
intentional tort case, where the mens rea analysis is concerned more with
the consequences of tortious action. 162 Putting aside any policy-based
reasons for this inversion,163 this is a clear departure from the tort law norm.
Second, in most Section 2333 cases, as long as defendant provided
material support intending or consciously reckless to the fact that the
ultimate beneficiary was a terrorist organization or a group engaged in
terrorist activities, then courts seem to either explicitly or implicitly assume
defendant intended to assist or consciously and recklessly disregarded the
risk of contributing to terrorist violence. As tort commentators have noted,
however, the notion that “‘all acts lead to intended consequences’ is far too
broad a construct” and “tells us nothing about the particular consequences
of that act, nor the actor’s state of mind regarding those consequences,”
which remain important. 164 By focusing on the mens rea for the act and
collapsing it into the mens rea for its consequences, many Section 2333
decisions misapprehend the work scienter is supposed to do in intentional
tort cases.
Third, the conscious recklessness standard adopted in some Section 2333
cases does not satisfy the requirements of tort law. In tort, recklessness can
serve as a “proxy for intent” only where “defendant was subjectively aware
of the consequences of his act—not necessarily that it would cause the exact
injury, but at least that it was certainly likely to cause an injury to
plaintiff.”165 In the Section 2333 context, however, the conscious
recklessness standard only demands that “the donor knows the character of
th[e] organization,” 166 which can be satisfied where defendant “strongly
suspect[s] the truth but [does] not car[e] about [it].”167 This is far from
162. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 43, at 1137 (noting that, in intentional tort law, intent is
meant to focus more on the consequences of the act than the act itself).
163. Some courts have justified Section 2333’s expansive scienter requirement on the concern
that a more robust mens rea standard would make civil material support cases harder to bring. See Boim
III, 549 F.3d at 698–99 (refusing to require proof that defendant intended her material support be used
for terrorism as this “would as a practical matter eliminate donor liability except in cases in whic h the
donor was foolish enough to admit his true intent”). This concern is not necessarily an accurate one,
however. See infra note 297.
164. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 43, at 1137–38.
165. Saba v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 78 F.3d 664, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (holding that recklessness, when equated with willful or intentional
conduct, requires that defendant “must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn
that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference”).
166. Boim III, 594 F.3d at 695.
167. Id. at 699.
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evidence of defendant’s “subjective state of mind” about the consequences
of her actions.168
Related to this, the conscious recklessness standard in Section 2333 cases
arguably weakens the “deliberateness” associated with the act itself. It is
true this standard is a fairly low one and that “[e]very act that is not literally
compelled by the physical act of another . . . or the result of an involuntary
muscle spasm, is a deliberate . . . one.”169 But, as conceived by tort law,
acting deliberately still requires behaving in accordance with one’s own will
and purpose. In some Section 2333 cases, deliberateness may be satisfied
by something less than such purposeful action. For example, according to
the logic of Boim III, a person who acted purposefully in supporting a
charity’s humanitarian work is treated as deliberately sustaining a terrorist
organization, as long as she consciously and recklessly disregarded an
affiliation between the two groups.170 While this may be more than an
“involuntary muscle spasm,” it is hard to argue that defendants in these
situations are providing material support to terrorist entities, in accordance
with their own will and purpose.171
In all these ways, Section 2333’s mens rea has evolved to defy traditional
expectations for an intentional tort. The courts’ increasingly liberal
approach to this critical element of a civil material support claim expands
168. See, e.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844 (holding that defendants may show that they did not behave
recklessly by, for example, demonstrating “that they did not know of the underlying facts indicating a
sufficiently substantial danger and that they were therefore unaware of a danger, or that they knew the
underlying facts but believed (albeit unsoundly) that the risk to which the facts gave rise was
insubstantial or nonexistent”). There are also other problems with using conscious recklessness in the
Section 2333 context. In discussing the concept’s limits, the Restatement (Third) notes that conscious
recklessness “loses its persuasiveness when the identity of potential victims becomes vaguer and when,
in a related way, the time frame involving the actor’s conduct expands and the causal sequence
connecting conduct and harm becomes more complex.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARMS § 1 cmt. e. Courts hearing Section 2333 claims tend to discount
such mitigating factors, including defendant’s lack of awareness about the identity of victims or relevant
act of terrorism, as well as the passage of time between the act and its alleged consequences. See, e.g.,
Linde I, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 586 (holding that defendant need not have specific intent to cause the act of
terrorism that injured plaintiff, in order to be liable under Section 2333); Boim III, 549 F.3d at 699–700
(“To the objection that the logic of our analysis would allow the imposition of liability on someone who
with the requisite state of mind contributed to a terrorist organization in 1995 that killed an American
abroad in 2045 . . . the imposition of liability in the hypothetical case would not be as outlandish, given
the character of terrorism, as one might think.”).
169. In re Geiger, 113 F.3d 848, 852 (8th Cir. 1997).
170. Boim III, 549 F.3d at 698.
171. The weakening of deliberateness, as well as the collapsing of the mens rea analysis for the
act and its consequences, are partially a result of congressional “findings” contained in the ATA’s
legislative history relating to the “fungibility of money” and the “tainted” nature of terrorist
organizations. See infra Part IV.B. As for those cases requiring knowledge of the terrorist character of
an organization, there is an argument to be made that this standard is more robust than deliberateness.
Even assuming this is correct, it does not compensate for eliminating mens rea for the consequences of
providing material support. It is, after all, this scienter element that is most important in intentional tort
law.
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liability in unusual ways and leaves little justification for the statute’s
automatic trebling of damages.172 These problems are further aggravated by
the simultaneous loosening of Section 2333’s causation element, which is
explored in the next section.
2. Section 2333’s Exceptional Causation Requirement
Under Section 2333, a U.S. national may bring a claim for injury “by
reason of an act of international terrorism.” 173 This language is generally
and widely understood to require a causal showing in civil material support
cases. In practice, however, many courts have taken an approach to
causation that effectively nullifies this requirement.
On the issue of factual causation, there is effectively unanimous
agreement that Section 2333 does not require this element.174 As the courts
have held, demanding factual causation “at least in the material support
context, . . . would come up against the basic problem of the fungibility of
money.”175 The “fungibility of money” refers to the fact that money (and,
by extension, support more generally) can be used to facilitate innumerable
activities; as the logic goes, because of fungibility, it is impossible to know
whose funds (or support) brought about plaintiff’s injury by a terrorist
organization and, therefore, inappropriate to expect plaintiffs to establish
factual causation in civil material support cases.176
On the issue of legal causation, the courts have exhibited more
disagreement. A minority has explicitly held that legal causation need not

172. By gutting the scienter requirement, the courts have eviscerated the main justification for
permitting treble damages in Section 2333 cases—namely that defendant’s behavior was deliberately
wrongful and aimed at causing harm.
173. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (emphasis added).
174. Linde I, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 584–85; Weiss I, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 631. In Boim II, however, the
court did require causation in fact:
On remand, the Boims will have to demonstrate an adequate causal link between the death of
David Boim and the actions of [defendants]. This will require evidence that the conduct of each
defendant, be it direct involvement with or support of Hamas’s terrorist activities or indirect
support of Hamas or its affiliates, helped bring about the terrorist attack that ended David
Boim’s life. . . . [T]he plaintiffs must be able to produce some evidence permitting a jury to
find that the activities of [defendants] contributed to the fatal attack on David Boim and were
therefore a cause in fact of his death. Absent such proof, [] appellants will be entitled to
judgment in their favor.
Boim II, 511 F.3d at 710–11 (emphasis added). The Boim II decision is considered an outlier on the issue
of factual causation.
175. Gill I, 891 F. Supp. 2d at 367.
176. Boim III, 549 F.3d at 698. As with the justifications used to eviscerate scienter, this argument
is rooted in the ATA’s legislative history. Part IV.B explores how the courts have deployed this
legislative history in ways that are unusual, inappropriate, and suffused by a particular political
perspective on terrorism.
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be established.177 Most courts have taken the opposite position, however,
and insisted that legal causation is required. Even amongst these courts,
however, legal causation has effectively been abandoned where material
support has allegedly been directly given to a terrorist organization, its
agents, or alter-egos.
Because the approach to factual causation is largely consistent in Section
2333 cases, the remainder of this section will explore the contours of legal
causation, including its contested and evolving nature.
a. Legal Causation under Section 2333
In Boim I, the Seventh Circuit clearly held that legal causation was
necessary to sustain a Section 2333 claim. Pointing to the language of the
statute, the court concluded that “a plaintiff must be injured ‘by reason of’
an act of international terrorism,” which “[t]he Supreme Court has
interpreted . . . [as] requir[ing] a showing of proximate cause.” 178
Elaborating on its holding, the court explained that “[f]oreseeability is the
cornerstone of proximate cause, and in tort law, a defendant will be held
liable only for those injuries that might have reasonably been anticipated as
a natural consequence of the defendant’s actions.” 179 Since Boim I, the vast
majority of cases have required legal causation in Section 2333 suit, and
have typically described that requirement in terms of foreseeability. 180
The Boim III court stands apart from this jurisprudence, by effectively
rejecting legal causation as a requirement of Section 2333. While the court
conceded that “[i]t is ‘black letter’ law that tort liability requires proof of
causation,” 181 it argued that “like much legal shorthand, the black letter is
inaccurate if treated as exceptionless.”182 The court went on to insist that
legal causation was essentially unnecessary because, as a rule, material

177. Notably, those courts explicitly rejecting legal causation have not claimed that Section
2333’s “by reason of” language creates anything other than a causal requirement. See Boim III, 549 F.3d
at 695–99 (eliminating proximate causation without challenging the meaning of Section 2333’s “by
reason of” language).
178. Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1011.
179. Id. at 1012.
180. See, e.g., Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 53 (“To satisfy the ordinary tort requirement of causation
and foreseeability, as well as the textual requirement that injury be suffered ‘by reason of’ an act of
international terrorism, plaintiffs must plead that an alleged act of international terrorism proximately
caused their injury.”); Abecassis I, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 665 (holding that legal causation was required in
Section 2333 causes and that “[f]oreseeability is the cornerstone of proximate cause . . .”) (internal
quotations and citation omitted). But see Fields v. Twitter, 881 F.3d 739, 748 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[F]or
purposes of the ATA, it is a direct relationship, rather than foreseeability, that is required.”).
181. Boim III, 549 F.3d at 695.
182. Id.
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support “significantly enhance[s] the risk of terrorist acts and thus the
probability [of injury].” 183
Because Boim III took such an extreme position, numerous courts
expressly rejected its rationale and continued to require legal cause in
Section 2333 cases.184 In one influential post-Boim III decision on causation,
the Second Circuit in Rothstein v. UBS AG held that “if, in creating civil
liability through § 2333, Congress had intended to allow recovery upon a
showing lower than proximate cause, we think it either would have so stated
expressly or would at least have chosen language that had not commonly
been interpreted to require proximate cause for the prior 100 years.”185
Despite this strong rationale and rhetorical support for legal causation across
most jurisdictions, many courts have, in fact, mimicked the holding of Boim
III by adopting a per se rule on legal cause, in cases involving direct support
to terrorist organizations, their agents, or alter-egos. According to this rule,
an act of terrorist violence that follows the alleged provision of material
support to a terrorist organization, its agents, or alter-egos is, as a matter of
law, the natural and foreseeable result of that support.186 No additional
showing of legal cause is necessary. 187 In fact, courts have been adopting
this approach, since before the Boim III decision. In 2003, for example, the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held that because “[a]ny
terrorist act . . . might have been the natural and probable consequence of
knowingly and intentionally providing financial support” to a terrorist
organization, legal causation was satisfied.188 A few years later, the District
Court for the Eastern District of New York concluded that, to establish legal
causation under Section 2333, plaintiffs need not show they were harmed
183. Id. at 698. To justify its analysis, the court drew parallels with joint tortfeasor jurisprudence
and argued that “[i]n all [those] cases the requirement of proving causation is relaxed because otherwise
there would be a wrong and an injury but no remedy because the court would be unable to determine
which wrongdoer inflicted the injury.” Id. at 697. The court failed to mention, however, that joint
tortfeasor cases relax the standard for factual, not legal, causation, as discussed below in Part II.B.2.b.
See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 721–24 (Wood, J., dissenting) (noting that majority’s analysis of joint tortfeasor
cases was incorrect and failed to appreciate that the standard for factual, rather than legal, causation was
loosened in those cases).
184. See, e.g., Abecassis I, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 664–65 (rejecting Boim III’s approach to legal
causation and requiring that plaintiffs establish legal cause in Section 2333 cases).
185. Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 95 (2d Cir. 2013) [hereinafter Rothstein III]. In Rothstein
III, plaintiffs brought a Section 2333 claim for aiding and abetting against UBS for providing the Iranian
government with financial assistance that was allegedly used to fund terrorist attacks committed by
Hezbollah and Hamas.
186. In analyzing proximate causation, the Rothstein III court disallowed precisely this sort of
rule. See id. at 96 (rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that proximate cause was established after UBS
provided material support to Iran because “that would mean that any provider of U.S. currency to a state
sponsor of terrorism would be strictly liable for injuries subsequently caused by a terrorist organization
associated with that state”).
187. Id.
188. Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 86, 105 (D.D.C. 2003).
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by reason of defendant’s actions, but only that they were injured by an act
of international terrorism committed by a terrorist organization that
defendant materially supported.189 Building on this case law, the District
Court for the Eastern District of New York held in a post-Boim III decision
that “proximate cause may be established by a showing only that defendant
provided material support to, or collected funds for a terrorist organization
which brought about plaintiffs’ injuries.”190
By collapsing the causation inquiry into a showing that defendant
provided material support to a terrorist group, its agents, or alter-egos, many
courts have effectively abandoned legal causation in Section 2333 cases.191
b. Departing from Traditional Causation Principles
As with scienter, Section 2333 cases have broken with traditional tort
norms on causation. On the element of factual cause, this is true for the vast
majority of civil material support suits. As for legal causation, cases
involving alleged direct support to terrorist organizations, their agents, or
alter-egos are also out-of-line with traditional tort approaches.
At first blush, there seems to be some precedent for dispensing with
factual causation in Section 2333 cases. In joint tortfeasor suits, for
example, courts have not demanded a literal showing of factual cause, if it

189. Linde I, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 581, 585.
190. Goldberg v. UBS AG, 660 F. Supp. 2d 410, 429 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (internal quotations and
citations omitted). See Weiss I, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 631–32 (concluding that proximate causation is
established where plaintiff alleges that defendant provided material support to a terrorist group that
caused plaintiff’s injuries, before those injuries were suffered); Strauss I, 2006 WL 2862704 at *18 (“[I]t
is clear that proximate cause may be established by a showing only that defendant provided material
support to, or collected funds for a terrorist organization which brought about plaintiffs’ injuries.”).
Though they appear to be outliers, a few recent cases, involving alleged material support to terrorist
organizations, their agents, or alter-egos, did not adopt a per se rule. See Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 217 F.
Supp. 3d 1116, 1127 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d 881 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that allegations
defendant provided material support to a terrorist organization are insufficient, in and of themselves, to
establish proximate causation); Gill II, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 556 (“[T]he court rejects the contention that
any reckless contribution to a terrorist group or its affiliate, no matter how attenuated, will result in civil
liability, without the demonstration of a proximate causal relationship to the plaintiff’s injury.”) (internal
quotations and citation omitted).
191. By contrast, where defendant has provided material support to a government, rather than to
a terrorist organization, its agents, or alter-egos, the courts have been more reticent to adopt a per se
causation rule. For example, in Rothstein III, the court parsed the allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint to
determine whether legal causation had been properly pled:
The Complaint does not allege that UBS was a participant in the terrorist attacks that injured
plaintiffs. It does not allege that UBS provided money to Hizbollah or Hamas. It does not allege
that U.S. currency UBS transferred to Iran was given to Hizbollah or Hamas. And it does not
allege that if UBS had not transferred U.S. currency to Iran, Iran, with its billions of dollars in
reserve, would not have funded the attacks in which plaintiffs were injured.
Rothstein III, 708 F.3d at 97. As discussed below, this difference in approach has much to do with the
ATA’s legislative history. See infra note 297.
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would absolve all defendants of liability.192 But even in these situations,
courts have not dispensed with factual causation altogether. Indeed, a joint
tortfeasor is only liable if her actions would have been the factual cause of
plaintiff’s injury, in the absence of other competing causes.193 By rejecting
factual causation altogether, then, Section 2333 cases step far outside what
tort law typically allows.
As for legal cause, explicitly abandoning this requirement is, of course,
out of keeping with tort norms. For several reasons, the adoption of a per se
rule also eviscerates customary tort approaches to causation. First, it
effectively does away with the in-depth fact-finding typically undertaken by
courts to determine whether defendant’s actions caused plaintiff’s injury.194
While there is still some need in the per se case for fact-finding, for example,
to show that the terrorist organization actually caused plaintiff’s injury and
that defendant provided material support to the group, its agents, or alteregos, this is a far cry from demanding evidence that defendant’s actions
themselves legally caused plaintiff’s harm. 195 Second, by declaring as a
matter of law that terrorist violence is the probable consequence of any and
all material support previously provided, the per se rule creates potentially
limitless liability, which is out of step with foreseeability.196 Even though
foreseeability is generally less rigorous in intentional tort cases, it assumes
the existence of factual causation197 and mens rea for the consequences of
192. Kilburn v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 376 F.3d 1123, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
193. See, e.g., Maxwell v. KPMG LLP, 520 F.3d 713, 716 (7th Cir. 2008) (“There are also cases
in which a condition that is not necessary, but is sufficient, is deemed the cause of an injury, as when
two fires join and destroy the plaintiff’s property and each one would have destroyed it by itself and so
was not a necessary condition; yet each of the firemakers (if negligent) is liable to the plaintiff for having
‘caused’ the injury.”). In her dissent in Boim III, Judge Wood vociferously argued for applying this
version of factual causation in Section 2333 cases. 549 F.3d at 722–23 (Wood, J., dissenting) (arguing
that, in joint tortfeasor cases “plaintiff cannot win without showing that the defendant’s act would have
been sufficient to cause the injury, even though it may be the case that other acts might also have been
sufficient. . . . So, too, must we insist that [defendants’] actions amounted to at least a sufficient cause
of the terrorist act that killed David Boim, even if, on these facts, there were multiple such causes.”)
(emphasis added).
194. See Stapleton, supra note 62, at 954–55 (discussing causation generally as a “question of
fact” to be submitted to a jury, in individual cases). This does not, of course, mean the law has no role
to play—indeed, legal rules, like foreseeability, are an important part of analyzing the appropriate scope
of liability. Rather, the point is that a per se rule of liability cannot substitute for the factual evidence
typically required to establish causation.
195. In her Boim III dissent, Judge Rovner highlighted this issue, arguing that the majority’s
decision, “rather than requiring plaintiffs to present evidence of causation and allowing the factfinder to
determine whether causation has been shown, . . . deems it a given, declaring as a matter of law that any
money knowingly given to a terrorist organization . . . is a cause of terrorist activity, period.” 549 F.3d
at 705 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
196. See Stapleton, supra note 62, at 984 (“The law’s concern that a defendant not be held liable
for the infinite stream of consequences flowing from tortious conduct requires the limitation of every
obligation to a finite set of consequences.”).
197. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 33 cmt. e
(AM. LAW INST. 2010).
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one’s actions.198 Since Section 2333 claims require neither of these two
factors, there is no legal justification for expanding causation in these cases
beyond the traditional definition of foreseeability. Finally, Section 2333’s
approach to factual and legal causation is out of step with other tort-based
statutes that contain the same “by reason of” language.199 In examining the
meaning of this phrase, the Supreme Court has held that it requires a
showing of both kinds of causation.200 On this score, judicial interpretations
of the civil material support statute are, obviously, deficient. 201
By eliminating factual causation, and effectively reducing legal cause to
a per se rule of liability whenever direct support has allegedly gone to a
terrorist group, its agents, or alter-egos, Section 2333 cases have established
“as a matter of law that any money given to [a terrorist] organization,”
regardless of whether it also engages in non-violent activities, “necessarily
enables its terrorism, regardless of the purpose for which the money was
given or the channel through which the organization received it.” 202 This,
combined with the statute’s substantially weakened mens rea standard,
creates a liability framework that erodes many of the conceptual and
practical limits typically demanded by tort law.

198. As the Restatement (Third) of Torts makes clear, it is because a tortfeasor intended to cause
harm that she is liable for a broader range of consequences than she would be if she had acted negligently.
Id. § 33 cmt. a. Indeed, in determining the appropriate scope of liability in these cases, the Restatement
has counseled that “the moral culpability of the actor, as reflected in the reasons for and intent in
committing the tortious acts, [and] the seriousness of harm intended and threatened by those acts” be
taken into consideration. Id. § 33(b).
199. Statutes with the “by reason of” language include the private right of action under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), as well as the anti-trust statutes, the
Sherman and Clayton Acts. Under RICO’s private right of action, “[a]ny person injured in his business
or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate
United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit,
including a reasonable attorney’s fee.” 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (emphasis added). Under the Clayton and
Sherman Acts’ private right of action, “any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor . . . and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.” 15 U.S.C. § 15
(emphasis added).
200. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992).
201. It is worth noting that, in construing claims under these other statutes, courts do not resort to
per se rules of legal causation and, instead, regularly parse the facts to determine if defendant’s actions
were the legal cause of plaintiff’s injury. See Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply, 547 U.S. 451 (2006) (examining
facts of case in concluding that plaintiff’s injuries were too attenuated from defendant’s alleged RICO
violations to satisfy proximate causation); In re Flonase Antitrust Litig., 798 F. Supp. 2d 619 (E.D. Pa.
2011) (examining evidence presented on summary judgment, in concluding that no genuine issue of
material fact existed as to whether defendant’s alleged violation of the Clayton Act proximately caused
plaintiffs’ injuries).
202. Boim III, 549 F.3d at 709 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
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3. How Section 2333 Defies Theories of Tort Law
Section 2333 is not only out-of-step with traditional intentional tort
jurisprudence. It also fails to comport with the prevailing theories of tort
law. While the economic and corrective justice theories may each provide a
partial explanation for the statute’s development, neither fully describes
how and why Section 2333 cases operate as they do.203 This further
underscores the unique and unusual way in which Section 2333 has
developed.
a. The Economic Theory of Tort Law
The economic theory of torts would seem to, at least partially, illuminate
Section 2333 case law.204 With its general disdain for causation, the theory
provides a rationale for the effective elimination of this concept in many
civil material support cases.205 Because it puts little emphasis on individual
culpability as distinct from efficiency, the theory would also seem to support
the elimination of a mens rea requirement for the consequences of providing
material support.206 Finally, with the actual perpetrators of terrorist activity
largely beyond the reach of U.S. courts, the economic theory would appear
to justify the presumption that third-party supporters of terrorist
organizations or their activities are best positioned to reduce the social costs
of terrorist violence.
There are, however, economic costs created by Section 2333, which
suggest the statute may not, in fact, be an efficient one. Specifically, the
statute may over-deter actual and prospective defendants. Over-deterrence
occurs where, for example, a weak mens rea standard coupled with high
penalties, like treble damages, induce precautions that chill wholly
legitimate activities. 207 In the case of Section 2333, more often than not,
203. Some commentators have suggested that the economic and corrective justice theories of tort
are themselves flawed because some torts are explained by one theory, but not the other. See Christopher
J. Robinette, Can There Be a Unified Theory of Torts? A Pluralist Suggestion from History and Doctrine,
43 BRANDEIS L.J. 369 (2005) (focusing on automobile accidents and medical malpractice claims to
argue that none of the prevailing theories of tort provide a unified explanation of the discipline because
they cannot explain both these types of claims). Without taking a position on this issue, this argument is
different from the one being made here, namely, that neither of the prevailing theories explain why
Section 2333 cases function the way they do.
204. Indeed, Judge Richard Posner, a major figure in developing the economic theory of torts,
wrote the majority opinion in Boim III.
205. As discussed above, according to the economic theory of torts, it is the “least cost avoider”
and not the person who legally and factually caused plaintiff’s injury who is liable. See supra Part I.B.1.
206. Id.
207. See Keith N. Hylton, Intent in Tort Law, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 1217, 1225–26, 1235 (2010)
(arguing that where an intentional tort carries a punitive damage award, a higher mens rea, namely
“foresee[ing] or intend[ing] the immediate harm or ultimate physical consequence of [defendant’s]
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claims are brought against groups, like charitable organizations and banks,
which indisputably provide a host of innocent and often critical assistance,
like routine banking services and funding for humanitarian efforts, to a
diversity of communities and individuals. Being held liable under Section
2333 can have a substantial, adverse impact on these organizations and their
ability to continue serving these clients, most of whom have no ties to
terrorism or terrorist organizations.208 Even the mere accusation of
providing material support to terrorist groups, their agents, or alter-egos can
negatively impact the reputation and economic viability of these
institutions.209 Where organizations operate in regions associated with
terrorism, the risk of liability under Section 2333 may leave them with little
option other than to shutter operations. 210 For charities working in these
regions, the statute may have an even broader impact. As commentators
have shown, the criminal material support laws have created a chilling effect
on donations to these groups and, as a result, have negatively impacted their
humanitarian work. 211 Given its close relationship to these laws, Section
2333 may conceivably have a similar effect.
actions,” is required and that, without this higher mens rea, the liability rule may over-deter such that
the “benefits foregone by constraining the activity exceed the costs avoided”).
208. Arab Bank, which is the third largest lender in the Arab world, is an example of an
organization with a substantial and diverse customer base that has likely been negatively impacted by
Section 2333 litigation. In September 2014, the jury in Linde v. Arab Bank returned a verdict holding
Arab Bank, which is headquartered in Jordan, liable for dozens of attacks committed by Hamas in the
West Bank, Gaza, and Israel, between 2001 and 2004. A year later, Arab Bank settled the case for $1
billion, though the settlement remained contingent on the bank’s pending appeal before the Second
Circuit. Stephanie Clifford, Arab Bank Reaches Settlement in Suit Accusing It of Financing Terrorism,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/15/nyregion/arab-bank-reaches-settlem
ent-in-suit-accusing-it-of-financing-terrorism.html?_r=0. In February 2018, the Second Circuit
overturned and vacated the jury verdict. Linde III, 882 F.3d at 332. Per the parties’ previous agreement,
the settlement remained in place, though payout amounts to plaintiffs were adjusted as a result of Arab
Bank’s victory. Id. at 332–33. Regardless of this outcome, irreversible reputational damage to Arab
Bank has likely been done. See Motion for Leave to File Brief of Amicus Curiae Hashemite Kingdom
of Jordan In Support of Petitioner at 17, Arab Bank, PLC v. Linde, 134 S. Ct. 2869 (2014) (No. 121485) (arguing that a verdict against Arab Bank would devastate the organization because “[b]anks
depend on doing business with other banks—and no bank wants to do business with a bank labeled a
terrorism-financier by the United States”). Harm to Arab Bank’s business also hurts the countless
individuals and institutions that depend on its services. Id. at 18. (“The damage to Arab Bank’s reputation
as a sound and reliable financial institution could also threaten . . . its role as . . . an important depository
institution for many corporate and individual clients with ties to the [Middle East] region.”).
209. See Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 86, 103 (D.D.C. 2003) (“The
use of the privileged medium of a lawsuit to publicly label someone an accomplice of terrorists can
cause incalculable reputational damage. Placing that person in a situation in which he must retain counsel
and defend himself has dramatic economic consequences as well.”).
210. See Geoffrey Sant, So Banks Are Terrorists Now?: The Misuse of the Civil Suit Provision of
the Anti-Terrorism Act, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 533, 586 (2013) (noting that the risk of liability under Section
2333, and its attendant treble damages award, may drive international banks operating in troubled
regions out of business or force them to abandon those areas).
211. The criminal material support laws have had a complex effect on charitable giving to
Muslims and Arab charities and, by extension, on their humanitarian work. In examining the laws’
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Further exacerbating these inefficient results, there is no empirical
evidence that pursuing charities, banks, or other institutions that have
purportedly provided support to terrorist organizations alongside their many
other legitimate activities, reduces the incidence of or otherwise has any
impact on terrorism. In the absence of such evidence, targeting these
organizations arguably creates more social costs212 and fewer benefits.213
Finally, though it may over-deter inadvertent supporters of terrorist
groups or activities,214 Section 2333 has a questionable deterrent effect on
an important category of individuals and groups, namely, those intentionally
providing material support. These actors challenge the notion of a riskneutral, self-interested person upon which the economic theory relies.
Instead, they are presumably engaged, at least in some cases, in an
ideological project that may or may not impact their personal satisfaction.215
As a result, they may calculate the costs and benefits of providing material

impact on American Muslim charitable groups, Malick Ghachem notes that the effects have fluctuated
over time and been both direct and indirect:
By nearly all accounts, the crackdown on Muslim American charities did cause a significant
drop in charitable giving and expenditures in the years after 9/11. More recently, during the
period from 2005 or 2006 to the present, there have been indications of a significant rebound
that suggest the earlier drop has, over time, been counterbalanced by correspondingly greater
amounts of giving to the handful of Muslim American charities that have survived the post9/11 era unscathed, such as Islamic Relief USA. But the fate of the operational side of Muslim
charitable activity remains uncertain. This appears to be due to ongoing restrictions on the
ability of religious and secular organizations to deliver humanitarian aid to conflict zones, and
the reluctance of banks and other financial institutions to work with Muslim charities for fear
of sanctions in the event that money laundering or terrorism financing charges are brought.
Ghachem, supra note 26, at 166.
212. These costs include the time and effort needed to identify the prohibited material support.
See, e.g., FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, EMERGING TERRORIST FINANCING RISKS 21 (2015), http://www.fat
f-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Emerging-Terrorist-Financing-Risks.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5
Q6-CTZY] (“[T]errorism financing through the banking sector is often small-scale and can be difficult
to distinguish from the large number of legitimate financial transactions undertaken each day.”).
213. In particular, without empirical evidence that terrorism is being furthered by specific
charitable organizations, stopping financial flows to these groups has substantially inefficient
consequences. See IBRAHIM WARDE, THE TRUTH BEHIND THE FINANCIAL WAR ON TERROR 149 (2007)
(noting that the government “crackdown” on Islamic charities in the United States after 9/11 had a
negative effect on donations “just as welfare and humanitarian relief needs were most needed”).
214. Samuel Rascoff, Counterterrorism and New Deterrence, 89 N.Y.U L. REV. 830, 836 n.23
(2014).
215. This is not meant to suggest that terrorists are undeterrable because they are irrational, even
evil, actors. Id. at 832. Rather, the point, here, is that the economic theory’s deterrence model, which is
based on maximizing economic utility, may not work with certain actors. Generally, deterrence is about
engaging “motivations, decisionmaking, and intentions.” Alex Wilner, Contemporary Deterrence
Theory and Counterterrorism: A Bridge Too Far?, 47 N.Y.U J. INT’L L. & POL. 439, 451 (2015). For
these reasons, literature on deterrence’s role in counterterrorism generally “‘rejects . . . unitary rational
actor assumptions’” in favor of “tailored deterrence” strategies that appreciate how different actors, from
“terrorist foot soldiers” to financiers, have different motivations and behave differently. Rascoff, supra
note 214, at 837–38. Such tailoring is absent from the deterrence model embraced by the economic
theory of tort, making it less effective with some groups.
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support in different ways from individuals seeking to maximize economic
utility.216
b. Corrective Justice Theory of Tort Law
The corrective justice theory of torts also has some explanatory power
where Section 2333 cases are concerned. Most obviously, it helps elucidate
why notions of morality seem to play an enormous role in these legal
decisions.217 It is less effective, however, in explaining the absence of mens
rea for the consequences of providing material support. If defendant did not
intend to “bring about” the results of her actions, then arguably she should
not be required, according to the principles of corrective justice, to “reverse
the transaction” that led to plaintiff’s injury.
The corrective justice theory also falls short in explaining why causation
has been effectively written out of the statute. 218 Far from being “the doer
and sufferer of the same injustice,” parties in Section 2333 cases are
indirectly connected to one another by a terrorist group (or, in some cases,
by a group that was connected to a terrorist organization), which was the
actual “doer” that caused plaintiff’s “suffering.”219 Since that suffering need
not be factually connected to defendant’s actions, defendant is not obliged,
under the theory of corrective justice, to compensate plaintiff, financially or
otherwise. This conclusion is even more true in cases involving direct
material support to a terrorist organization, its agents, or alter-egos, where
both factual and legal causation has been eliminated. In these circumstances,
there is no more than a “serendipitous causal connection between the

216. There may also be other non-economic efficiency factors, aside from politics and ideology,
motivating someone to intentionally support a terrorist organization. See Sameer Ahmed, Is History
Repeating Itself: Sentencing Young American Muslims in the War on Terror, 126 YALE L.J. 1520, 1548
(2017) (noting “there is no single profile of why one chooses to participate in terrorist activity,” and
that “potential factors include political grievances, mental illness . . . trauma, and a sense of belonging,
adventure, and notoriety”).
217. Courts often use stark, moral language in discussing the purported acts of terrorism involved
in Section 2333 cases. See, e.g., Boim III, 549 F.3d at 718 (Rovner, J., dissenting) (describing the death
of plaintiffs’ son as “an unspeakably brutal and senseless act”); id. at 719 (Wood, J., dissenting) (noting
that “this is a heart-breaking case” and that “[n]o parent can fail to empathize with [plaintiffs], who lost
their son to the evil of terrorism just as he was on the brink of all of life’s promise.”). As commentators
have noted, “the degree to which courts have chosen to paint emotionally moving portraits of the victims
of terrorism is unusual [in Section 2333 cases]” and is “absent from other cases,” including murder cases.
Sant, supra note 210, at 556.
218. Because causation is also a necessary component of the civil recourse and compensation
theories of torts, Section 2333 cases cannot be fully explained by these approaches either.
219. Weinrib, supra note 88, at 353.
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tortious aspect of the actor’s conduct and the other’s harm,” 220 which falls
far short of corrective justice’s liability requirements.221
4. Limitless Liability
In Boim I, the court explicitly rejected the possibility that simply
providing funds to a terrorist organization, without establishing scienter and
causation, could satisfy Section 2333.222 As the court explained, allowing
the statute to apply in those circumstances would mean “[a]ny act [by
defendant] which turns out to facilitate terrorism, however remote that act
may be from actual violence and regardless of the actor’s intent” would
expose defendant to liability. 223 As courts have moved away from Boim I
and closer to Boim III, this result has effectively come to pass.224 With
scienter often reduced to conscious recklessness about the terrorist nature
of the recipient organization and causation all but eliminated in most cases,
the limits of liability are, at best, uncertain and, at worse, nearly nonexistent
under Section 2333. This state of affairs makes the civil material support
statute an outlier in intentional tort law, a reality further underscored by its
failure to comport with prevailing theories of tort.
As discussed in Part III, below, this exceptional doctrinal cocktail has
the potential to create adverse effects for the discipline of tort law, writ
large.
III. HOW SECTION 2333 CASES MAY ERODE TORT LAW
For two reasons, Section 2333’s exceptionalism could have a long-term,
negative impact on tort law as a field. First, Section 2333 could plausibly
create more confusion about the meaning of key concepts, like scienter and
causation. Though there are prevailing definitions for both, disagreement
exists about how scienter and causation apply in some circumstances.
Insofar as Section 2333 contributes to and exacerbates this, it could, to some

220. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 30 cmt. b
(AM. LAW INST. 2010).
221. Because causation is centrally important to the theory of corrective justice, it is inappropriate
to pursue defendants simply because they have “deep pockets” or are “in a position to distribute losses
broadly.” Weinrib, supra note 88, at 351. It is often, however, precisely these factors, rather than
defendants’ causal connection to plaintiffs’ injuries, that drive Section 2333 cases. See infra note 302.
222. Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1011–12.
223. Id.
224. As the Abecassis I court noted, the implications of Boim III are so broad that, “if taken to
[their] logical extension, [they] could make any person liable if that person knows that (or is deliberately
indifferent to whether) Hamas commits terrorist attacks in Israel, if even $1 of that person’s money ends
up in Hamas’s bank account.” 704 F. Supp. 2d at 664.
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degree, further erode the clarity of these terms and the coherence of tort law,
more generally.
Should national security objectives become more pervasive in tort law,
Section 2333’s approach to scienter and causation could also have a
substantive effect on other torts. A parallel trend is playing out in criminal
law, where concerns with national security and especially terrorism have
gradually played a larger role in the discipline.225 As a result, even though
anti-terrorism laws, tactics, and prosecutions are a miniscule part of the
national criminal docket, they have had a spillover effect on other areas of
criminal law and policing.226 Despite the relatively small universe of Section
2333 cases, judicial decisions in these matters could similarly have a more
direct influence on developments in tort.
Second, Section 2333 litigation has effectively produced a high-octane,
hybrid criminal tort statute, or “extreme crimtort,”227 which blurs the line
between tort and criminal law. The doctrinal separation between the two
disciplines is one most scholars of criminal law and torts consider important,
for both normative and practical reasons. In Section 2333 cases, however,
courts have disregarded the differences between the two areas, and
essentially treated the statute as a civil analogue to the criminal material
support provisions. Indeed, in many cases, courts have either expanded or
eliminated the statute’s scienter and causation elements, by subsuming the
tortious character of Section 2333 under the criminal material support
statutes.
This section begins by exploring Section 2333’s potential impact on the
coherence and clarity of tort law, as a discipline, before exploring its status
as an extreme crimtort. As discussed more fully in Part IV, the influence of
criminal law in Section 2333 cases is closely tied to and a result of the War
on Terror, itself.

225. Dru Stevenson, Effect of the National Security Paradigm on Criminal Law, 22 STAN. L.
POL’Y REV. 129 (2011) (arguing that there has been a national security paradigm shift in criminal law
over the last several decades).
226. Id. at 136.
227. The term “crimtort” was first coined by Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig. Thomas
Koenig, Crimtorts: A Cure for Hardening of the Categories, 17 WIDENER L.J. 733, 734 (2008).
According to their definition, a “crimtort” blends torts and criminal law by combining tort actions with
punitive damage awards. Id. at 736. Even though Section 2333 carries a treble, rather than punitive,
damages award, the statute still qualifies as a crimtort. See supra note 53 (noting that treble damages are
punitive in nature). In fact, as discussed in Part III.B, Section 2333 goes far beyond a traditional crimtort.
The term is useful here, as it linguistically captures the hybrid criminal-tort nature of the civil material
support statute. The qualifier “extreme” has been added, however, in order to highlight Section 2333’s
departure from the standard crimtort.
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A. Section 2333’s Potential Impact on Tort Law’s Coherence and Clarity
As a centuries old area of law, tort jurisprudence has historically been a
mix of heterogeneous and miscellaneous causes of action, ranging from
matters of individual privacy and interference with land use to competition
amongst businesses and industrial accidents. In the late nineteenth-century,
scholars attempted to impose some discipline on this disorganization, by
developing a unified set of doctrines and theories of tort.228 It was through
this ordering process, which continues to this day, that the field of tort law
took shape.229
While these efforts have been far from perfect, and hampered by tort’s
laws own ad-hoc origins,230 for most tort scholars, it has remained important
to locate and define nodes of confusion and either resolve or define these
points as exceptions to the norm. 231 Even where conceptual inconsistencies
may have only a limited impact on the discipline, there is an appreciation
that “doctrine matters and that, whenever possible, both courts and
commentators should attempt to understand and explain as clearly as
possible” why certain tort cases come out the way they do. 232 Indeed, the
various Restatements of Torts, particularly the Restatement (Second) and
Restatement (Third), have attempted to define and bring clarity to the
sometimes conflicting parts of this area of law.
Tort law’s endemic doctrinal inconsistencies may, themselves, have
enabled Section 2333’s unusual jurisprudence. That being said, the statute’s
departure from tort norms is so dramatic that it may aggravate existing
problems within the discipline.233 Though one might expect the extreme
228. G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 3–4 (Expanded
ed., 2003). It was not until the late nineteenth century that tort law was considered a separate and discrete
discipline, rather than a catch-all subject for causes of action that did not fit into the more “pure” areas
of criminal law, contracts, and property. Robinette, supra note 203, at 390–93.
229. Over the course of tort law’s development as a discrete discipline, some scholars have
challenged attempts to create a coherent organizational structure. See, e.g., Robinette, supra note 203
(charting the historical roots and evolution of attempts to develop a unified theory of torts, as well as
backlash toward them). Their efforts have, however, largely given way to the more pervasive belief that
tort law benefits from ordering principles and rationales. Id.
230. WHITE, supra note 228, at 8.
231. See, e.g., Stapleton, supra note 62, at 943–45 (criticizing the “incoherent” treatment of
causation in the Restatements); Henderson & Twerski, supra note 43, at 1136 (noting that the “concept
of intent is too fundamental to be allowed to shift meanings across different factual contexts” and that,
in defining the term in the Restatement (Third), it “must be kept stable in the sense that [it] must have
the same meaning whenever employed in defining tortious acts”).
232. Moore, supra note 47, at 1594.
233. In fact, Section 2333 could create confusion where little currently exists. By suggesting there
is no mens rea for the consequences of an act, for example, Section 2333 arguably muddies historical
developments in intentional torts. As intentional tort law has evolved, there has been a move away from,
not toward, more robust intent requirements. The writ of trespass, which included battery, assault, false
imprisonment, as well as intentional torts to property, was the first tort to emerge out of English common
law and did not require fault. Id. at 1607. But, as the law developed, especially over the course of the
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nature of Section 2333 case law to limit its broader application, this may be
less likely, as courts continue to describe the statute as a traditional
intentional tort. Indeed, since the law on Section 2333 is so plaintifffriendly, enterprising litigants would be well-served to rely on the continued
normalization of this jurisprudence and use these decisions to support
expansive interpretations of scienter and causation in other intentional tort
actions. For example, where a lack of clarity exists over the mens rea for an
intentional tort, plaintiffs could argue and courts might conceivably adopt,
or at least look to, Section 2333’s scienter standard, in conducting their
analysis.234 In fact, some courts have already displayed a willingness to look
to the statute’s mens rea for guidance in such cases. 235 Section 2333 could
create similar opportunities to expand the definition of legal causation. 236
By effectively eliminating legal cause in most cases, Section 2333 distorts
the bedrock norm that an actor, even one that behaved intentionally, is only
liable for those harms the likelihood of which were increased by her tortious
conduct. This is an enticing prospect for any plaintiff looking to prevail in
a tort matter. In fact, at least one court construing a different intentional tort
nineteenth century, courts began to require some degree of fault for a number of old trespass writs, like
battery. Id. at 1607–09; see also Fletcher, supra note 82, at 539 (noting the general ascendancy of fault
in nineteenth century tort law). The single-intent requirement took shape, at this stage. Moore, supra
note 47, at 1609–10. Over the course of the twentieth century, doctrinal developments shifted away from
single-intent and toward dual-intent for intentional tort claims. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 8A (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“The word ‘intent’ is used throughout the Restatement . . . to denote that
the actor desires to cause the consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are
substantially certain to result from it.”). By embracing a single-intent approach to the statute, prevailing
case law on Section 2333 could create confusion over this fairly well-established normative evolution.
234. As noted above, debate exists over whether battery requires intent to make bodily contact, as
well as an intent to cause harm. See supra note 47. Even when the single-intent rule is applied, however,
some level of fault must still be shown, though it is more akin to negligence than intent. See Simons,
supra note 47, at 1092 (arguing that, even on the single-intent view, battery requires two kinds of fault,
namely, the intent to commit the act itself, as well as negligence as to the victim’s lack of consent). With
most Section 2333 cases requiring only intent to commit the act, and no fault for causing its consequence,
this jurisprudence could be useful to plaintiffs challenging even the negligence-like fault standard used
in single-intent battery jurisdictions. Of course, this is not to suggest that Section 2333 cases would be
particularly persuasive for courts considering these or other intentional torts. Rather, the claim made
here is more modest, namely, that Section 2333 cases could influence other areas of intentional tort law,
particularly where there is existing confusion or dispute over concepts.
235. See, e.g., SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 594 F.3d 1360, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(in case involving dispute over mens rea requirement for intentional inducement of patent infringement,
citing approvingly to Boim III’s holding that intentional misconduct equates to knowledge or deliberate
indifference).
236. The concept of legal causation is not only subject to much confusion. See supra note 60. It is
also notoriously susceptible to manipulation by creative plaintiffs. Generally, courts have pushed back
against these attempts to expand the contours of the concept. Stapleton, supra note 62, at 953. In so
doing, they have taken pains to define legal causation “sharply, in fine detail, and, to the extent possible,
. . . secured by precedent.” Id. at 955. What is concerning about Section 2333 cases is that courts appear
to be moving in the opposite direction, and are sanctioning, rather than limiting, expansions of legal
cause. With courts reticent to police this evisceration, it remains possible that Section 2333 cases could
engender further confusion over the precise nature of legal causation.
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has cited to Section 2333 jurisprudence to suggest legal causation could, in
some circumstances, be eliminated. 237
Finally, civil material support cases could have an even greater impact
on tort doctrine, if a national security paradigm takes firmer root in the
discipline. There is already evidence tort law is assuming a more prominent
place in dealing with terrorist violence.238 It is possible, if not probable,
therefore, that national security objectives could become a more important
feature of this area of law. On the criminal side, national security has had a
growing influence, permeating criminal justice and policing even in nonterrorism cases.239 As a result, national security goals240 have increasingly
shaped various criminal law doctrines and approaches.241 For example,
judicial interpretations of “the scienter requirement of the ‘material support
for terrorism’ statute [have] generate[d] binding precedent for non-terrorism
cases that use identical phrasing.” 242 While the parallels are not exact,
Section 2333 could have an analogous impact on scienter and causation
norms in other tort cases, particularly if those cases have a national security
bent. While this may seem unlikely now, the shift to a national security
mindset in criminal law was no more inevitable and occurred gradually. 243
Driven by such a mindset, in which community safety is valued over
individual liability, courts could, for example, look to Section 2333 to
237. See Breeden v. Novartis Pharmaceutical Corps., 714 F. Supp. 2d 33, 36 (D.D.C. 2010)
(noting that “by reason of” the language in Family and Medical Leave Act incorporates a proximate
causation requirement, but suggesting possible exceptions to this standard by citing to Boim III’s
adoption of a “‘relaxed’ causation element, based on policy considerations”).
238. Besides Section 2333, there are other tort-based avenues available to private plaintiffs who
want to bring terrorism-related claims. Cases can, for example, be brought under the Torture Victims
Protection Act of 1991, § 1 et seq., 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note, the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350,
and a USA PATRIOT ACT amendment to RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. See USA PATRIOT ACT,
P.L. 107-56, § 813 (2001) (amending RICO to include “any act that is indictable under any provision
listed” in the ATA’s criminal liability section). Plaintiffs can also sue designated state sponsors of
terrorism under Section 1605A of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et
seq. Plaintiffs can and often do supplement these statutory claims for terrorism-related injuries with
various common law tort claims, including battery, assault, infliction of emotional distress, wrongful
death, false imprisonment, as well as aiding and abetting or conspiracy related to these or other
applicable torts. Strauss, supra note 36, at 714–18.
239. Stevenson, supra note 225, at 131 (arguing there has been a “gradual advent of a new phase
in which the national security emphasis permeates our entire criminal law framework”) (emphasis
added).
240. These objectives include privileging the peace and safety of society over individual liability
and dangerousness and emphasizing the elimination of risks and incapacitation of threats. Id. at 154.
241. The specter of national security has helped move criminal law away from its traditional
deterrence and retribution models toward prevention. It has also inspired new criminal statutes that, like
the criminal material support laws, prohibit non-dangerous activities that may lead to crime. On the
policing and prosecution front, surveillance and infiltration by undercover agents have taken on greater
importance. See id. at 137–40.
242. Id. at 151.
243. While a deeper look at this issue is beyond the scope of this Article, one of the goals here is
to encourage scholars and practitioners to pay attention and follow national security developments in
tort law, in the long term, and be aware of their potentially broader reach in the discipline.
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broaden the scienter element for tort claims, in terrorism-related matters
and, perhaps, even in non-terrorism-related cases.
B. Section 2333 as an Extreme Crimtort
Across most countries and cultures, criminal and civil law have long
been treated as separate and distinct domains. In the words of one scholar,
“every society sufficiently developed to have a formal legal system uses the
criminal-civil distinction as an organizing principle.” 244 Nevertheless,
within civil law, torts enjoy the closest historical relationship to crime. In
early English common law, for example, the same wrong, from rape to
burglary to unpaid debts, could be pursued as either a crime or a tort.245 The
distinction between the two areas of law, during this period, was primarily
one of procedures and penalties.246 Over time, however, the division
between criminal and tort law became more pronounced, affecting who
could bring suit, what sort of harm could be prosecuted, 247 available
penalties, and the proportional relationship (or lack thereof) between the
penalty and the wrong.248
Academics have long discussed the normative value of maintaining this
separation between criminal and tort law systems. Some have focused on
the distinction’s social utility, with criminal law described as imposing the
highest cost (imprisonment) for the least socially beneficial activities.249
Others have justified the distinction between tort and criminal law, by
pointing to the latter’s role “as an instrument of moral socialization” that
prohibits and punishes, while describing tort law as focused more on

244. Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert, 76 B.U. L. REV.
201, 202 (1996).
245. David J. Seipp, The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the Early Common Law, 76 B.U.
L. REV. 59, 59–60 (1996).
246. Crimes and torts, both of which could be brought by private victims, carried different
consequences for the accused. Crimes were usually punishable by death, while torts typically involved
payment of damages to the victim, as well as imprisonment and fines. Id.
247. In tort law, there is no harm without an injury—whether to person (physically or
emotionally), property, or business interests. By contrast, criminal law punishes acts that harm oneself,
dangerous acts that have yet to cause harm, and acts that are considered immoral, even if not harmful.
Kenneth W. Simons, The Crime/Tort Distinction: Legal Doctrine and Normative Perspectives, 17
WIDENER L.J. 719, 720 (2008).
248. In criminal law, the “[p]unishment should be proportional to the culpability of the actor and
the seriousness of the harm or wrong he has committed or threatened.” Id. at 721. Tort law, by contrast,
does not attempt to make remedies proportional to harm. While punitive damages are an exception to
this rule, they “are not nearly as sensitive to differences in degrees of culpability as criminal law
sanctions are.” Id.
249. See Richard Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193,
1195 (1985) (arguing that the “main differences between substantive criminal law and substantive tort
law can be derived from the differences in (1) the social costs of criminal and tort sanctions and (2) the
social benefits of the underlying conduct regulated by these two bodies of law”).
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compensation.250 Combining the moral with the utilitarian, still others have
argued that there is a universal “human desire to make moral judgements,”
“that there is practical value in giving formal legal expression to this human
desire . . . and that a distinct criminal justice system [separate from torts] is
the only way to effectively express condemnation and to gain the practical
benefits of doing so.” 251
In addition to these normative arguments, there are meaningful doctrinal
reasons for maintaining criminal and tort law as two distinct fields. Criminal
law is primarily focused on the criminal act and actor. 252 While the
consequences of an offense are not irrelevant, victimless crimes are
numerous and prevalent.253 By contrast, tort law focuses less on the actor
and her unlawful actions, and more on the consequences of the act and
injury to victim.254 There are also different evidentiary norms. In the civil
context, plaintiff is usually held to the lower preponderance of the evidence
standard, while in the criminal context, the state must prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. These differences make blending the two areas of law
highly problematic. To import elements of a criminal statute into the tort
context, for example, ignores the fact that those criminal concepts were
developed with a higher standard of proof in mind.
Despite the many justifications for separating the two areas, the line
between tort and criminal law does sometimes blur.255 On the tort side, this
phenomenon is embodied in the crimtort. 256 The prototypical crimtort is a
250. John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 221–38 (1991).
251. Robinson, supra note 244, at 207–08. While most commentators have supported a division
between tort and criminal law, there are some who see value in loosening this boundary. See, e.g.,
Koenig, supra note 227, at 738–39 (arguing for an end to the “false dichotomy between criminal and
tort law”).
252. Cane, supra note 46, at 553.
253. Id.
254. Rather than focusing on the consequences of defendant’s actions, Section 2333 is almost
exclusively concerned with the problematic nature of the actions, themselves, namely the provision of
material support. This is reflected, most clearly, in the effective elimination of causation from Section
2333, as discussed earlier.
255. Various commentators have sounded the alarm bells about the increasing convergence of
criminal and tort law. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 250, at 193 (noting with concern that “substantive
federal criminal law over the last decade has seen the disappearance of any clearly definable line between
civil and criminal law”). The key point, however, is not that there is or should be a rigid and absolute
line between criminal and tort law, or that particular, long-held features of one discipline must be
eliminated because they embody the normative justifications of the other, though there are those who
make that argument. See generally James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic
That Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117 (1984) (arguing that punitive damages, which
are designed to punish, have no place in tort law, which is designed to compensate). Rather, the concern
is that the normative and practical reasons for maintaining a separation between tort and criminal law
are generally being undermined with negative effects on both sides.
256. On the criminal side, the blurring of the crime/tort divide can be seen in the increasing use
of criminal law to sanction wrongs that arguably should be treated as torts. See Coffee, supra note 250,
at 202–10 (discussing various examples of criminal sanctions being applied to areas of tort law, like
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cause of action in tort law that seeks to vindicate broad societal interests
through punitive damages awards. 257 Section 2333 case law is a version of
this hybrid phenomenon, albeit an extreme one thanks to its active
incorporation of criminal law doctrine. 258 Section 2333’s extreme crimtort
credentials are reflected, in part, in its lack of mens rea for the consequences
of providing material support. This innovation directly parallels the criminal
material support statutes, especially Section 2339B. In embracing a similar
standard, Section 2333 jurisprudence reflects a criminal, rather than tort,
law approach to liability, in which desire to cause terrorist violence is
unnecessary. On causation, Sections 2339A and 2339B, again, seem
influential. Generally, in criminal law, when injuries or victims are not an
element of the crime, as is the case with the two criminal statutes, causation
is irrelevant and unnecessary. In rejecting factual causation and
substantially weakening legal causation in some cases, Section 2333
jurisprudence appears far closer to the criminal material support laws than
to other intentional torts.259
Section 2333’s criminal law-like tendencies are notable, even when
compared with other extreme crimtorts, like the civil RICO statute. RICO
targets organized criminal networks in the business community,260 and, like
the ATA, includes a private right of action. Under this provision, persons
injured in their business or property as a result of a criminal RICO violation
may bring a tort suit.261 Like Section 2333, civil RICO carries a treble
damages award, and is silent on mens rea.262 In construing the statute, courts
fiduciary duties). Tort principles are also increasingly being incorporated into some traditional areas of
criminal law See, e.g., Noah M. Kazis, Tort Concepts in Traffic Crimes, 125 YALE L.J. 1131 (2016)
(arguing that, where traffic crimes are concerned, criminal law is increasingly adopting tort principles).
257. Koenig, supra note 227, at 736. For Koenig, crimtorts are necessary, rather than problematic,
innovations.
258. Crimtorts do not import substantive principles of criminal law into tort causes of actions. See
generally id. In Section 2333 cases, however, some courts have been fairly explicit in their view that the
statute incorporates criminal law principles. In Gill v. Arab Bank, the court described Section 2333 as a
“unique” statute in which “tort and criminal law have become closely intertwined. . . .” Gill II, 893 F.
Supp. 2d at 482, 484. In Boim III, the court also grounded its Section 2333 analysis in both tort and
criminal law. For example, while the court concluded that Section 2333 did not recognize aiding and
abetting liability, it held that “[p]rimary liability in the form of material support to terrorism has the
character of secondary liability” and that “when [] primary liability is that of someone who aids someone
else, so that functionally the primary violator is an aider and abettor or other secondary actor, a different
set of principles come into play . . . [which] are most fully developed in the criminal context.” Boim III,
549 F.3d at 692.
259. As discussed in Part IV.B, the courts have also heavily relied on Section 2339B’s legislative
history to effectively eliminate legal causation from Section 2333 cases involving direct support to
terrorist groups, their agents, or alter-egos.
260. RICO was enacted as part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, which sought to
eradicate organized crime in the United States. Statement of Finding and Purpose, Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922.
261. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012).
262. Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 908 (3d Cir. 1991).

Washington University Open Scholarship

612

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 96:559

have held that, in order to prevail, plaintiff must establish that defendant
committed one of RICO’s predicate criminal acts. 263 This means the mens
rea attached to the relevant criminal offense is also an element of a civil
RICO claim.264 While this approach seems quite similar to Section 2333
cases, there is a particularly important difference between the jurisprudence.
In contrast to Section 2333 cases, courts have consistently required
causation, both factual and legal, in civil RICO suits. 265
For these various reasons, Section 2333 takes the increasing convergence
between tort and criminal law even further than other torts with a criminal
cast. There is nothing in Section 2333’s text that makes this result an
inevitable one.266 As the Boim I court insisted, the civil statute operates
independently from the underlying criminal material support laws.267 Even
the Boim III court warned that “we must be careful in borrowing from
criminal law because the state-of-mind and causation requirements in
criminal cases often differ from those in civil cases.” 268
In fact, criminal law’s integration into Section 2333 jurisprudence
appears to be guided less by these legal concerns and more by policy. As
the case law demonstrates, courts are concerned that Section 2333 liability
be, at least, as broad as culpability under the criminal material support laws.
At first blush, this position may seem reasonable, since guilt is usually
harder to establish in the criminal, rather than civil, context. The criminal
material support statutes, however, have a lower liability threshold
compared to traditional intentional torts. While to a limited extent, the
criminal law’s higher evidentiary standard makes up for this looser
benchmark, these protections do not exist on the civil side. In adopting the
liability framework for the criminal statutes, the courts have ignored these
red flags, while also disregarding Section 2333’s text, legislative history,
and the requirements of tort law. This willingness to abandon legal norms

263. Rep. of Panama v. BCCI Holdings, 119 F.3d 935, 948 (11th Cir. 1997).
264. Depending upon the circuit, plaintiff must prove either one or two types of mens rea.
Regardless of the circuit, plaintiff must show defendant had “the specific intent associated with the
various underlying predicate offenses.” Genty, 937 F.2d at 908. Some circuits also require that plaintiff
prove that defendant acted “with the specific intent to participate in the overall RICO criminal
enterprise.” Zolfaghari v. Sheikholeslami, 943 F.2d 451, 454 (4th Cir. 1991).
265. See Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 265–68 (1992) (holding
that civil RICO requires a showing of factual and legal causation).
266. Section 2333 provides a cause of action for “acts of international terrorism.” 18 U.S.C. §
2331(1) (2012). While those acts are, in part, defined and set by the criminal law, there is nothing in
Section 2333 or its legislative history that suggests those criminal laws determine the scienter and
causation elements of the civil statute itself.
267. Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1016 (“We are using section 2339A and 2339B not as independent
sources of liability under section 2333, but to amplify what Congress meant by ‘international
terrorism.’”).
268. Boim III, 549 F.3d at 692. The Boim III court clearly did not heed its own advice.
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is rooted, in large part, in a particular political ideology on terrorism—an
issue explored in the next section.
IV. HOW SECTION 2333 HAS BEEN IMPACTED BY THE W AR ON TERROR
While the criminal material support statutes have played an important
role in Section 2333’s jurisprudence, this phenomenon is closely tied to the
War on Terror and its influence over judicial perceptions of the civil statute.
As a general matter, since 9/11, there has been an ideological trend, both
within the judiciary and broader American society, in favor of treating
terrorism as a uniquely dangerous, existential threat to the United States. In
the context of Section 2333, courts have used aspects of the ATA’s
legislative history, which embrace this same ideological view and are
directly tied to the criminal, rather than civil, material support statutes, to
justify expanding liability under Section 2333.
This section begins by explaining the political ideology on terrorism,
which has been influential in Section 2333 cases and otherwise, and ends
by examining how courts have manipulated the ATA’s legislative history to
enlarge the civil statute’s liability framework, to serve that normative
perspective.
A. Views about Terrorism’s “Unique, Existential” Threat & Their Impact
on Section 2333 Cases
As a general matter, since September 11th, many courts have come to
view terrorism as sui generis, or “in a class by itself.” 269 This belief has
galvanized courts to ensure Section 2333 is an effective tool in the War on
Terror. Far from an inevitability, however, this view about the existential
danger of terrorism has little to no empirical basis.270 It is, instead, the
product of a politically and historically-driven conceptual shift that has
269. Id. at 698.
270. Many have written critically about the belief that terrorism is an existential threat. See, e.g.,
Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1039–40 (2004) (arguing that while
terrorism may pose a threat to physical safety, it does not represent a danger to the future existence of
the United States or its political system). This criticism is supported by empirical research, which shows
that terrorism is far from an existential danger to the United States. See Peter Bergen, Albert Ford, Alyssa
Sims & David Sterman, Terrorism in America After 9/11, NEW AM. FOUNDATION, https://www.newame
rica.org/in-depth/terrorism-in-america/what-threat-united-states-today/#americas-layered-defenses htt
ps://perma.cc/4ZN9-MS64 (last visited Sept. 17, 2018) (concluding, based on comparisons with other
forms of violence, that terrorism is not an existential threat to the United States); John Mueller & Mark
G. Stewart, Hardly Existential: Thinking Rationally About Terrorism, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Apr. 2, 2010),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-america/2010-04-02/hardly-existential?page=show [http
s://perma.cc/GJF9-MKQ5] (applying risk assessment techniques and concluding that “[a]s a hazard to
human life in the United States, or in virtually any country outside of a war zone, terrorism under present
conditions presents a threat that is hardly existential”).
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gradually permeated American society, as well as the judiciary, over the last
several decades.271 Understanding this phenomenon is critical to unpacking
how and why America’s battle against terrorism has shaped Section 2333
case law.
It all began in the late 1960s, when terrorism increasingly became the
subject of mainstream political debate; in the process, it went from being
seen as a tactic, without deep moral significance, used by different, rational
actors, for rational reason, to a form of pure evil, beyond explanation or
comprehension.272 In the 1980s, in response to the Cold War, views on
terrorism evolved even further, with the concept becoming synonymous
with the Soviet Union’s civilizational “threat” to Western democracies.273
During this same period, military responses to terrorism grew in
popularity.274 After the Cold War ended, Islam replaced the Soviet Union as
the West’s new enemy.275 A new paradigm of “Islamic terror” developed,
altering the discourse on terrorism and inspiring language more extreme and
moralistic than before. 276 By the time 9/11 came along, the narrative of evil,
irrational “Islamic terrorists,” threatening the “Western way of life,” was
well established.277 It was, nevertheless, substantially strengthened by the
attacks, and more firmly rooted within American consciousness.
U.S. jurisprudence has generally reflected this evolving ideology on
terrorism. Examining Supreme Court case law, Wadie Said has noted, for
instance, that, for most of the twentieth century, the Court approached
terrorism as a “tactic” used to further a diverse set of “political” goals. 278
Beginning in the late 1960s, 279 this perspective began to shift somewhat, as
the Court started to view terrorism as a particular danger to U.S. national
security, though it stopped short of classifying it as a “worldwide existential
threat to free societies everywhere.” 280 After 9/11, the Court’s views

271. Mueller & Stewart, supra note 270 (noting that, despite evidence to the contrary, “[a]n
impressively large number of politicians, opinion makers, scholars, bureaucrats, and ordinary people
hold that terrorism . . . poses an existential threat to the United States.”).
272. LISA STAMPNITZKY, DISCIPLINING TERROR: HOW EXPERTS INVENTED “TERRORISM” 49–82
(2013).
273. Id. at 109–10.
274. By contrast, during the 1970s, the U.S. government approached terrorism from the
perspective of law, risk, and crisis management. Id. at 108.
275. Id. at 140–46.
276. According to proponents of this inflammatory polemic, there was now a “new type of
terrorist, extraordinarily irrational in both goals and actions, and prone to committing unprecedented
levels of violence.” Id. at 140.
277. Id. at 175.
278. Wadie E. Said, Humanitarian Law Project and the Supreme Court’s Construction of
Terrorism, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1455, 1473 (2011).
279. Id. at 1476.
280. Id.
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transformed dramatically, as it came to see terrorism as an “existential threat
to American civilization.”281
In post-9/11 America, courts hearing Section 2333 matters have
sometimes explicitly adopted this view on terrorism. In one civil material
support case, for example, the court engaged in a long soliloquy about
fashioning the right kind of tort regime to deal with terrorism’s
unprecedented dangers:
This country is now involved in a world-wide battle with a range of
enemies, spanning from those organized on the largest scale, supported by
nations, to individuals motivated by egocentric hatred. The resulting
struggle has led to the development of new military techniques, new
concepts of criminal law projected abroad, and new civil tort liability
problems, both procedural and substantive. In applying the general tort law
theory to requite [sic] injured individuals’ damages . . . new wine must be
carefully poured into old civil litigation bottles. 282
In another Section 2333 case, the court pointed to the importance of
“imped[ing] terrorism,” to support its expansive interpretation of
causation.283
To align Section 2333 with this particular ideological perspective, courts
have relied heavily on Section 2339B’s legislative history. That record
makes sweeping generalizations, without any evidentiary basis, about
terrorist organizations and their so-called nature. Courts have, nevertheless,
seized upon these normative claims and used them in Section 2333 cases to
expand liability, in the service of the War on Terror’s ideological interests.

281. Id. at 1485. As Said argues, the Court began to develop and express this view in the early
2000s, in a line of habeas corpus cases brought by so-called enemy combatants captured by the U.S.
military and held at Guantanamo Bay. Id. These include Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004), Rasul
v Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S.
557 (2006), and Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2007). It is, however, the Holder v. Humanitarian
Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010), case that represents the high watermark in the Court’s existential
approach to terrorism. As Said argues, by prohibiting support for the non-violent activities of FTOs that
presented no direct threat to the United States or American citizens, the Court came “as close as it can
to stating that terrorism—regardless of target and place—is the enemy.” Said, supra note 278, at 1505–
06.
282. Gill II, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 484. In Boim III, the court implicitly emphasized the importance
of fighting terrorism, over the need to adhere to traditional tort principles on scienter:
Anyone who knowingly contributes to the nonviolent wing of an organization that he knows to
engage in terrorism is knowingly contributing to the organization’s terrorist activities. And that
is the only knowledge that can reasonably be required as a premise for liability. To require
proof that the donor intended that his contribution be used for terrorism—to make a benign
intent a defense—would as a practical matter eliminate donor liability except in cases in which
the donor was foolish enough to admit his true intent.
Boim III, 549 F.3d at 698.
283. Linde II, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 326. In her dissent in Boim III, Judge Rovner described the
majority’s decision to effectively eliminate legal causation as a byproduct of its belief that terrorism was
an exceptional phenomenon. 549 F.3d at 705–06 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
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B. Manipulating the ATA’s Legislative History
Section 2339B’s legislative history reinforces the belief that terrorism is
an existential threat. The House Judiciary Committee report on the AEDPA
amendments, for example, describes terrorism as the most “potentially
threatening” and “destructive” thing to all Americans, at home or abroad. 284
In Section 2333 cases, the courts have used two particular legislative
“findings” from this record to align the civil statute with the prevailing
ideological narrative on terrorism. Though these so-called findings have
nothing to do with Section 2333 itself, they have been regularly relied upon
by courts hearing these cases.
The first “finding” relates to the supposedly tainted nature of all terrorist
organizations. In passing 2339B, Congress concluded that “foreign
organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal
conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that
conduct.” 285 The second “finding” concerns the “fungibility of money.”
According to this theory, [a]llowing an individual to supply funds, goods,
or services to an organization or to any of its subgroups, that draw
significant funding from the main organization’s treasury, helps defray the
costs to the terrorist organization of running the ostensibly legitimate
activities. This in turn frees an equal sum that can be spent on terrorist
activities.286
As David Cole has observed, there are various problems with these
assertions. The “taint” theory, for example, is a normative claim, rather than
a finding of fact.287 Most terrorist groups “do not exist for the purpose of
engaging in terrorism” and instead have a political purpose, which they try
to achieve using both lawful and unlawful means. 288 “It simply does not
follow [as a factual matter],” Cole argues, “that all organizations that use or
threaten to use violence will turn any donation that supports their lawful
activities into money for terrorism.” 289 On the fungibility theory, Cole notes
that, because it effectively applies to money going to any organization or
group, it proves too much and goes too far.290 The theory cannot, for
example, be used to criminalize all kinds of support to terrorist groups,
including for non-violent, humanitarian activities, without also
criminalizing contributions to other organizations that may engage in a
284. H.R. REP. NO. 104-383, at 41 (1995).
285. Anti–Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214, 1247 § 301(a)(7) (1996).
286. H.R. REP. NO. 104-383, at 81.
287. Cole, supra note 24, at 12.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
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menu of legal and illegal acts. 291 As Cole argues, if “fungibility” was
enough to establish liability, [t]he state could make it a crime to provide
newspapers or social services to gang members, to pay dues to the
Communist Party, or to make a donation to the Republican Party, on the
grounds that each of these organizations has engaged and may in the future
engage in illegal activity and that giving them material support would free
up resources that could then be used to further the group’s illegal ends. 292
While in the HLP III case the Supreme Court effectively concluded that,
in terrorism support cases, the fungibility theory was a strong basis for
establishing liability,293 in other contexts, it has rejected, on First
Amendment grounds, the idea that any support to organizations, engaging
in legal and illegal work, necessarily frees up resources.294 At the very least,
this inconsistency suggests that, even under the Court’s jurisprudence,
fungibility is, at best, a dubious liability principle.295
Though there is no evidence to support either the taint or fungibility
theory,296 courts have used both “findings” to effectively eliminate
causation in Section 2333 cases, where the direct recipient of aid is a
terrorist organization, its agents, or alter-egos.297 For example, in Boim III,
the court held that, because of money’s fungibility and the tainted nature of
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. HLP III, 561 U.S. at 29–36 (2010).
294. As Cole argues, the U.S. government unsuccessfully argued in U.S. v. Scales, 367 U.S. 203
(1961), that “knowingly joining an organization with illegal objectives contributes to the attainment of
those objectives because of the support given by membership itself.” Cole, supra note 24, at 12 n.48.
Though Professor Cole raised these arguments several years before the Supreme Court decision in HLP
III, as counsel in that case, he presented those same points to the Court. See generally Holder, 561 U.S.
1.
295. In a dissenting opinion in HLP III, Justice Breyer highlighted the inconsistencies between
the majority opinion’s view on fungibility and Supreme Court precedent, while also describing its
problematic implications for First Amendment free speech rights. Holder, 561 U.S. at 47–53 (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
296. Id.
297. The importance of the ATA’s legislative history, as a stand in for causation, is underscored
by cases where it has not been applied, namely, where a country, rather than a terrorist group or its
affiliates, is the direct recipient of material support. Though these nations are typically designated state
sponsors of terrorism, courts have explicitly distinguished these recipients from terrorist organizations,
their agents, or alter-egos and refused to use the ATA’s legislative history as a short cut to establishing
causation. In Rothstein v. UBS, AG, for example, the district court held that “the Supreme Court’s finding
that FTOs are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates
that conduct is specific to FTOs. . . . [and] does not necessarily, or even probably, apply to state sponsors
of terrorism.” 772 F. Supp. 2d 511, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) [hereinafter Rothstein II] (internal quotation
marks omitted). The court went on to reject plaintiffs’ argument that “providing any material support to
a designated terrorist entity furthers international terrorism as a matter of law” and reaffirmed its earlier
holding that plaintiffs had failed to establish causation. Id. at 517–18; see also Owens I, 235 F. Supp. 3d
at 99–100 (concluding that plaintiffs had failed to establish that defendant’s processing of funds for
Sudan caused their injuries and observing that “Congress’s finding [on the tainted nature of terrorist
organizations] [are] specific to foreign terrorist organizations, and did not include state sponsors of
terrorism”).
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terrorist organizations, donations to support Hamas’s social welfare services
were an inherent cause of the group’s terrorist activities. 298 In Linde v. Arab
Bank, the court explained that, because of the fungibility of money, factual
causation should not be required in Section 2333 cases.299 The court took a
similar approach in Goldberg v. UBS, basing its expanded notion of
causation, again, on money’s purported fungibility.300 As these examples
demonstrate, the courts’ ideological commitment to the War on Terror has
not only helped shape Section 2333 liability,301 in complete disregard of the
limits of statutory interpretation.302 It has also ensured that Section 2333
serves the war’s narrative about the unique and existential threat posed by
terrorism.

298. Boim III, 549 F.3d at 698–99.
299. Linde II, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 324. The court in Gill v. Arab Bank reached a similar conclusion,
holding that factual causation should not be required in the Section 2333 context because “[i]n most
instances, if a particular contribution was not made, money from other sources could be redistributed to
make up for the shortfall, and an attack could take place without a substantial donation.” Gill II, 893 F.
Supp. 2d at 507.
300. See Goldberg v. UBS AG, 660 F. Supp. 2d 410, 429 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Common sense
requires a conclusion that Congress did not intend to limit recovery to those plaintiffs who could show
that the very dollars sent to a terrorist organization were used to purchase the implements of violence
that caused harm to the plaintiff.”).
301. The ATA’s legislative history has arguably been used to help expand scienter, as well. In
incorporating conscious recklessness into Section 2333, for example, the Boim III court equated
providing support to a terrorist group to giving a gun to a child. “If you give a gun you know is loaded
to a child, you know you are creating a substantial risk of injury and therefore your doing so is reckless
and if the child shoots someone you will be liable to the victim,” the court reasoned. Boim III, 549 F.3d
at 691. In other words, because a terrorist organization will inevitably use any and all support to further
terrorism, because it is so deeply “tainted,” providing any assistance to such a group is inherently
reckless.
302. By relying on Congress’s so-called findings on taint and fungibility, the courts have perverted
the way legislative history, especially Congressional fact-finding, is traditionally used. In interpreting
and applying statutes, courts regularly look to a law’s history to discern legislative intent or clarify vague
language. They are not, however, permitted to use this history to displace the statutory text itself. See
Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 827, 844 (1991) (noting that, in interpreting statutes, courts may use legislative history
“as evidence of legislative intent” or to construe ambiguous words but not as a “substitute” for statutory
language). Where a case involves issues within the domain of the political branches, like national
security, courts may defer to Congressional fact-finding but must not abdicate their “judicial role” in
interpreting the law. See Holder, 561 U.S. at 33–34 (noting that deference should be given to Congress’s
finding “that all contributions to foreign terrorist organizations . . . further their terrorism” but also
observing that “concerns of national security and foreign relations do not warrant abdication of the
judicial role”). In relying on the fungibility and taint “findings,” Section 2333 cases have gone far
beyond these norms. First, when it comes to the statute itself, neither Section 2333’s text nor its
legislative history suggests that Congressional findings about terrorism or terrorist organizations ought
to serve as a substitute for causation or other prevailing tort law norms. To the contrary, as previously
discussed, Section 2333’s legislative history makes crystal clear that it should be construed as a
traditional tort. See S. REP. NO. 102-342, at 45 (1992) (“The substance of [a Section 2333] action is not
defined by the statute, because the fact patterns giving rise to such suits will be as varied and numerous
as those found in the law of torts.”). Second, the “findings” on taint and fungibility relate to a completely
different statute, Section 2339B, which has no causation requirement. Applying them to Section 2333
as a substitute for legal cause is, as such, inappropriate.

https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss3/3

2018]

HOW THE WAR ON TERROR IS TRANSFORMING PRIVATE LAW

619

CONCLUSION
In her dissent in Boim III, Judge Rovner captured the essential question
raised by Section 2333 litigation: “Are we going to evaluate claims for
terrorism-inflicted injuries using traditional legal standards, or are we going
to re-write tort law on the ground that ‘terrorism is sui generis’?”303
Since September 11th, the tension between these two alternatives has
continuously played out in case law on the civil material support statute. On
the one hand, courts have conceded that traditional tort principles apply to
Section 2333 claims. On the other hand, they have been eager to ensure
these cases serve broader national security interests. In the process, the
courts have divided over the proper balance to strike. Those courts that have
chosen to stick to traditional principles of legal liability have taken a
narrower approach to defining Section 2333’s scienter and causation
elements. Other courts, especially those concerned with the “existential
threat” of terrorism, have taken a more liberal approach to Section 2333 and
have sought guidance from the criminal statutes, rather than tort law, in
assessing liability.
Over the years, courts committed to developing a civil statute with a
muscular national security purpose appear to have won out. As a result,
Section 2333 cases have increasingly targeted defendants that often have
tenuous, and usually serendipitous, connections to terrorist groups or
activities, instead of for intentionally supporting terrorist violence. Indeed,
the statute has facilitated and encouraged cases against third-parties with
deep pockets, but little to no connection to the harms suffered by
plaintiffs.304 This is an unusual posture for a tort-based cause of action and
has been facilitated by the erosion of scienter and causation norms that have
traditionally protected against such expansive forms of civil liability.
From a legal perspective, fixing this situation is straightforward, and
simply requires a return to the traditional principles of tort in Section 2333
cases. This means applying scienter both to the act of providing material
support and its consequences. 305 It also means resurrecting factual
303. Boim III, 549 F.3d at 705 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
304. Sant, supra note 210, at 562, 576–78 (arguing that Section 2333 plaintiffs have largely
brought “frivolous lawsuits” and targeted banks and financial institutions not because they have caused
harm, but because they have the “deep pockets needed to pay these massive judgments”).
305. Conscious recklessness should also require actual knowledge of risk, as opposed to the looser
“suspicion” requirement articulated by Boim III, 549 F.3d at 699. Similarly, deliberateness in
committing the act should accord with defendant’s will and purpose. On a more general note, requiring
this sort of traditional tort law analysis on mens rea does not mean plaintiffs can never succeed on Section
2333 claims. In fact, in her dissent in Boim III, Judge Rovner rejected this assumption and observed that
“in other areas of the law where proof of a defendant’s intent is required[,] . . . there is rarely direct proof
of . . . intent, and yet [it] can be proved circumstantially.” Boim III, 549 F.3d at 715 (Rovner, J.,
dissenting).
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causation,306 demanding a meaningful showing of legal causation in all
Section 2333 cases, 307 and requiring courts to engage in traditional factfinding work. From a political and ideological perspective, these fixes may
be harder to implement. Changing the deeply ingrained view that terrorism
is a unique, existential danger requiring extraordinary measures is
challenging to say the least. This perspective is, however, a relatively new
one and came in response to particular political and historical developments.
It was not inevitable and certainly is not irreversible.
Nevertheless, for those who fear that more closely aligning Section 2333
with tort norms will penalize plaintiffs and imperil the fight against
terrorism, there are two responses. First, as mentioned earlier, Section
2333’s legislative history repeatedly emphasizes that the statute be treated
as a traditional tort. The adjustments to Section 2333’s interpretation
proposed here are, therefore, both legally and Congressionally mandated
ones. Any efforts to avoid them or generally weaken the statute’s tortious
character should be directed at Congress, not the courts. Second, even
though liability has been broadly defined under the statute, the vast majority
of Section 2333 cases have not resulted in judgments against third-party
supporters of terrorist groups or their activities. Currently, there are only a
handful of cases, out of over sixty brought under the statute, in which
plaintiffs have been awarded damages by the courts.308 This suggests that,
306. As with scienter, requiring factual causation in Section 2333 cases does not mean plaintiffs
will never be able to prevail on their claims. Indeed, in other kinds of cases, like joint tortfeasor matters,
courts have adopted an evidentiary approach to proving factual causation that substantially eases the
burden on plaintiffs. As formulated by the Restatement (Third) of Torts, where plaintiff sues
multiple actors and proves that each engaged in tortious conduct that exposed the plaintiff to a
risk of harm and that the tortious conduct of one or more of them caused the plaintiff’s harm
but the plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected to prove which actor or actors caused the harm,
the burden of proof, including both production and persuasion, on factual causation is shifted
to the defendants.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARMS § 28 (AM. LAW INST.
2010). According to this rule, each defendant has the burden of persuading the fact finder either that it
did not cause plaintiff’s injury or that another defendant was exclusively responsible. Id. § 28 cmt. n.
Putting aside the ostensible requirement that plaintiff sue “multiple” tortfeasors, this approach would
preserve the requirement of factual causation without creating an unsurmountable evidentiary obstacle
for plaintiffs in Section 2333 cases.
307. As mentioned earlier, where there is factual causation and intent to bring about the
consequences of one’s actions, legal causation may be relaxed in intentional tort cases. Nevertheless,
plaintiff must still show defendant’s actions increased the likelihood of her injuries. See supra note 64.
308. In Boim v. Holy Land Foundation 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008) and Linde v. Arab Bank,
PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), plaintiffs won their case at trial and received substantial
damages from the court. As previously noted, the Linde verdict was recently overturned by the Second
Circuit. See supra note 208. Sokolow v. PLO, 04 CIVIL 00397 (GBD), 2015 WL 10852003 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 1, 2015), also resulted in a damages award for plaintiffs, which was later overturned by the Second
Circuit. Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 835 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2016). Though some cases
have settled, many other ATA suits have been dismissed for lack of subject matter or personal
jurisdiction, for failure to state a claim, or on summary judgment. Plaintiffs have been more successful
where they have sued terrorist organizations themselves, since those groups, unsurprisingly, fail to
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even where liability is stretched far beyond tort law’s limits, the types of
claims being brought under Section 2333 are simply too thin to pass muster.
In effect, then, basic elements of tort law are being warped and mishandled
without purpose. While holding Section 2333 to the rigors of tort law is
unlikely to change the outcome in most cases, it stands a far greater chance
of rehabilitating the statute’s legal coherence and minimizing its adverse
effects on the discipline of torts.
The War on Terror may be a unique challenge, 309 but this is less because
of terrorism’s sui generis nature and more because of how we have decided
to treat it. Already, it has undermined various areas of public law and poses
a similar threat to the private law domain. As we contemplate how to
respond to this situation, we would do well to recall the challenge Judge
Diane Wood articulated in her dissent in Boim III: “[I]t is our responsibility
to ask whether [terrorism] presents so unique a threat as to justify the
abandonment of [] time-honored [legal] requirements. . . . [After all,] [o]ur
own response to a threat can sometimes pose as much of a threat to . . . the
rule of law as the threat itself.” 310

appear, triggering default judgments against them. See, e.g., Sisso v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 448 F.
Supp. 2d 76 (D.D.C. 2006) (granting default judgment against Hamas on ATA claims). Given the
difficulties involved in reaching the assets of FTOs, these awards are largely symbolic ones, however.
309. DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY 1 (3d ed., 2006).
310. Boim III, 549 F. 3d at 718–19 (Wood, J., dissenting).
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